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869 
DEFECTIVE PATENT DEFERENCE 
Tejas N. Narechania* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s implicit deference to the Office of the Solicitor General 
in patent cases is well-documented: What the Solicitor General requests, the Solicitor 
General typically receives. But we know far less about how the Solicitor General arrives at 
these preferred policy positions, or why the Solicitor General comes to advocate for some 
outcomes over others. This is problematic. In practically every other corner of the 
administrative state, an agency earns substantial deference to its views only where robust 
procedural protections attend to the policymaking process, where the agency’s outcome 
reflects its substantive expertise, and where the agency may, through presidential removal 
and election, be held politically accountable for its policy choices. 
Not so in patent law. The Patent Office has never claimed to exercise any substantive 
rulemaking power. Meanwhile, the Solicitor General develops and advocates for patent 
policy outcomes, but behind closed doors, without deep internal expertise, and under the time 
constraints of appellate litigation. These shortcomings (among others) suggest that we should 
reexamine the Solicitor General’s influence over patent policy in favor of alternate 
interpretive practices that improve Executive Branch decisionmaking. And they counsel in 
favor of several reforms—most importantly, to the policymaking power of the Patent Office. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Solicitor General of the United States is known to wield a wide 
influence over the United States Supreme Court’s decisions,1 so much so 
that the Solicitor General is sometimes called the “Tenth Justice.”2 This 
moniker suggests a role for the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 
that is adjunct to the Judiciary. But in patent contexts, OSG seems 
instead more like its counterparts across the Executive Branch, making 
(as well as defending) substantive policy. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision on the 
patentability of isolated genetic matter, Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.3 There, the Court unanimously held that 
“synthetically created DNA . . . is patent eligible because it is not 
naturally occurring” and that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a 
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been 
                                                   
1. See, e.g., Margaret M. Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in 
Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010) (“The U.S. Solicitor General, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s premier advocate, has long exerted significant influence over both the 
Court’s case selection decisions and its substantive decisions on the merits.”). 
2. E.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW (1987); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 94–100 
(1992); David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 168–69 (1998). Justice Kagan, however, once (perhaps jokingly) repudiated 
this characterization, suggesting that the Solicitor General was more like the “37th clerk” than the 
“10th Justice.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of Thomas Perrelli, Nominee, to be 
Associate Attorney General of the United States, and Elena Kagan, Nominee, to be Solicitor 
General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 47 (Feb. 10, 2009), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55828/pdf/CHRG-111shrg55828.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5LZ-LHKT] (statement of Elena Kagan) (“It is frequently said that the Solicitor 
General serves as the 10th Justice. . . . I suspect that the Justices think of the Solicitor General more 
as the 37th clerk.”); see also Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DUKE L.J. 964 (1987). 
3. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
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isolated.”4 That is, a gene’s patentability depends on whether it is 
“naturally occurring.”5 
But one exceptional aspect of this decision hides behind the Court’s 
opinion and in the Government’s amicus curiae brief in the case. There, 
the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Executive Branch, argued for this 
very same distinction: “Synthesized genetic materials . . . are patent-
eligible subject matter because they do not occur in nature” and that 
“isolated but otherwise unmodified DNA is not patent-eligible.”6 Some 
scholars have explained that though the Solicitor General’s argument 
(and the Supreme Court’s holding) is “not entirely compelling” “[f]rom 
a formal scientific or legal perspective,” it nevertheless embodies a 
reasonable policy approach in light of the difficult line drawing 
problems that attend to deciding what, exactly, ought to be patentable.7 
In short, faced with the legal ambiguity regarding the contours of patent 
eligibility, the Court seems to have accepted the policy approach 
advanced by the Solicitor General. 
One further, remarkable feature of Myriad lurks in the internal 
deliberative processes that informed the Solicitor General’s amicus brief. 
Unusually, no personnel from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (or 
Patent Office, for short) signed the Government’s brief in the case.8 And 
that notable absence seemed to reflect a “continuing inter-agency 
disagreement[]” over the correct policy approach to the patentability of 
isolated-but-naturally occurring DNA.9 That patent conflict was 
ultimately resolved—first, within the Executive Branch; and second, in 
the Judiciary—against the Patent Office.10 
Myriad thus highlights two important aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to its patent docket. 
                                                   
4. Id. at 580. 
5. Id. 
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9, Myriad, 569 U.S. 
576 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 390999 [hereinafter Myriad Amicus Brief]. 
7. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy 
Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1258–60 (2012) (“From a formal scientific or legal perspective, 
the distinction . . . is not entirely compelling . . . . From a policy standpoint, however, the U.S. 
government’s distinction has some appeal.”); see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane Nielsen & Dianne 
Nicol, Patenting Nature—A Comparative Perspective, 5 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 550, 571 (2018) 
(explaining that Australia’s High Court rejected a similar distinction because both types of DNA 
bear the same relevant characteristics). 
8. See Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 34. 
9. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
10. See infra section I.B.1; see also Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483 
(2015); cf. Jeffrey A. Burt & Irving S. Schloss, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The 
Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1457 (1969) (OSG’s “power over the agencies’ 
litigation substitutes executive for judicial review.”). 
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First, the Supreme Court often (though not always) appears to defer to 
the Executive Branch’s interpretations of the patent laws: Viewing the 
Executive Branch as more institutionally competent (for any of a variety 
of reasons) to decide these complex, technical cases, the Court seems 
content to adopt the views advanced by the Executive.11 Indeed, other 
scholars have explained that the Supreme Court applies a regime of 
“consultative deference” in patent cases, yielding a “shift in power from 
the courts to the [E]xecutive [B]ranch.”12 Such deference may be 
especially likely—and especially consequential—where the Executive 
Branch clarifies legal ambiguity through exercises of policy discretion. 
In most contexts, this would be rather unremarkable. Ever since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council,13 such deference to executive determinations has been routine.14 
But the administration of the patent system has long been one notable 
exception to this hornbook rule.15 For example, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit—the near-exclusive arbiter of patent appeals—has 
held (incorrectly, in my view) that the Patent Office has no authority to 
issue substantive patent rules.16 Indeed, the Supreme Court has since 
called the Federal Circuit’s rule into question.17 But the Patent Office 
nevertheless seems reluctant to issue authoritative rules of, say, patent 
                                                   
11. See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. David C. Thompson & Melanie F. 
Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for 
Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 281 
(2009). 
12. Lauren E. Baer & William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1111–
15 (2008); John Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV 518, 545 (2010). 
13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
14. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2014). 
15. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for 
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1971 (2013) (“The Federal Circuit has yet to afford the 
PTO’s validity determinations any deference, much less the highly deferential standard announced 
in Chevron.”); see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 544–45. 
16. See, e.g., Cooper Techs. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
the Patent Office has the power to issue to procedural rules, but not substantive ones); Merck & Co. 
v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that even “the broadest of the PTO’s 
rulemaking powers . . . does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules”). 
17. See Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (noting that the 
Patent Act “does not clearly contain” the Federal “Circuit’s claimed limitation” on Patent Office 
rulemaking power “to procedural rules” only); see also William C. Neer, Discerning the Retroactive 
Policymaking Powers of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 413, 
422 & n.69 (2019). 
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eligibility.18 Hence, any deference to the Executive Branch on matters of 
patent policy may seem—as a descriptive matter—remarkable. 
Second, the Supreme Court appears to defer to the Solicitor General’s 
Office in particular. Myriad highlights OSG’s practice of sometimes 
advancing arguments inconsistent with the Patent Office’s practices or 
rationales (to the extent the Patent Office has any such articulated 
views). It is, to be sure, somewhat unusual for the Solicitor General to 
directly contravene the views advanced by an agency with primary 
authority over a policy matter.19 But more subtle conflicts between OSG 
and the Patent Office often arise. Sometimes, for example, OSG will 
advocate for a rule that is inconsistent with the Patent Office’s 
established practices, or it will advance a new rationale for a Patent 
Office regulation. It is these arguments—rather than the established 
practices or the given rationales of the Patent Office—that seem to hold 
special sway. 
OSG’s special influence turns, in significant part, on the identity of its 
client: The United States of America. When the Solicitor General 
speaks, he speaks as the voice of a political branch, accountable to the 
public and committed to the country’s best interests.20 And OSG’s 
                                                   
18. But, as I elaborate infra notes 328–330 and accompanying text, the Patent Office has issued 
guidance to its examiners, attempting to “simplify and clarify” the work of determining whether an 
invention is patentable. See Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks 
Delivered at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Driving American Innovation Policy Conference 
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-us-chamber-
commerce-driving-american-innovation-policy [https://perma.cc/7S82-58JX]. And this Patent 
Office’s specific practices in this respect may be problematic in various respects. See infra notes 
380–386 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Patent Office has increasingly relied on 
adjudicative processes to set out, via agency precedent, procedural rules (as opposed to substantive 
patent rules). See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1667, 1720 (2019) (noting that, “in the main, these [precedential] opinions pertain to the procedural 
structure” of the Patent Office’s adjudicative processes). 
19. But for one such example, see Lorelei Laird, DOJ Argues that Law Doesn’t Protect 
Transgender Workers, Opposing the EEOC, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 26, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.abajo
urnal.com/news/article/doj_argues_that_law_doesnt_protect_transgender_workers_opposing_the_e
eoc [https://perma.cc/PM5W-9J2U]; see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as 
Mediator Between State and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 197–204. 
20. It is also true, of course, that the Solicitor General’s Office has a well-earned reputation for 
producing especially skilled advocates. Perhaps some of OSG’s successes can be attributed to such 
skill. But empirical studies of the Solicitor General’s Office and its lawyers cast serious doubt on 
that claim. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 89–
91 (2012) [hereinafter BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES] (finding that OSG’s 
relative success cannot be explained by the experience of its attorneys, the quality of its attorneys, 
its resource advantages, or its selectivity in case selection); see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. 
Owens, A Built-In Advantage: The Office of the Solicitor General and the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 
POL. RES. Q. 454, 457–61 (2012) [hereinafter Black & Owens, A Built-In Advantage] (similar). 
Instead, these studies suggest it is the Office’s professional, “credible commitment to broader goals 
of justice and efficiency” that “influences the Court.” BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
INFLUENCES, supra, at 91; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow 
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defenses of agency policies are, in the usual case, informed by the 
choices made by an expert agency, one that is itself delegated 
policymaking power from Congress, and that is required to undertake a 
public process of debate and consideration. Indeed, the Court recently 
explained that formal deference to the Executive Branch depends on 
such features, including congressional delegation, agency expertise, and 
deliberative process.21 
But these conditions do not typically apply to the views advanced by 
the Solicitor General’s Office in patent matters. So where there is 
conflict or inconsistency between OSG and the Patent Office—or even 
where there is no conflict, but where, instead, the Patent Office channels 
its policy preferences to the Court via OSG before testing these choices 
through typical administrative process—it is worth considering where 
authority, accountability, and expertise lie. Congress has not, for 
example, delegated any substantive interpretative authority over the 
patent laws to the Solicitor General.22 Though most agency 
policymaking processes are open for public comment and somewhat 
flexible, the Solicitor General’s consultative processes are largely 
shielded from public scrutiny and are governed by the relatively rigid 
demands of judicial process. And the Solicitor General has no special 
expertise in, say, innovation policy.23 In the end, OSG has arrived at a 
                                                   
Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2019) (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the 
Government: The Work of the Solicitor General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229 (1955)). In short, 
OSG’s institutional commitment to the interests of the public and the federal government—as 
opposed to mere short-term gains—seems to get some special credit from the Supreme Court. See 
infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text; section III.B; cf. Lisa F. Grumet, Hidden Nondefense: 
Partisanship in State Attorneys General Amicus Briefs and the Need for Transparency, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1859, 1860 (contending, analogously, that state attorneys general owe 
“accountability” and internal “separation of powers” duties to their home governments and 
constituencies in their Supreme Court advocacy). 
21. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019) (explaining that 
deference to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations depends on such factors). 
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2019). 
23. Of course, in cases like Myriad, the Solicitor General’s position may reflect the views of 
some other agency with relevant domain expertise—such as the National Institutes of Health. See 
Sandra S. Park, Gene Patents and the Public Interest: Litigating Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics and Lessons Moving Forward, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 519, 526 
(2014); see also Narechania, supra note 10, at 1504–06; Rai, supra note 7, at 1261. But even where 
the Solicitor General is thrust into the position of mediating such an interagency policy dispute, 
there remain competence- and process-based reasons to reconsider the extent of the Solicitor 
General’s influence. It is, for example, far from clear that Congress has delegated to OSG the power 
and responsibility to mediate such intra-Executive patent conflicts. Moreover, in such innovation 
contexts, OSG would seem to suffer an expertise deficit. And unlike many other forms of 
interagency deliberation, interested parties—private parties and sister agencies, among others—may 
have only limited, if any, opportunities to participate in OSG’s process of policymaking-by-
litigation. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2019) (describing a public rulemaking proceeding, 
but one which requires the Register of Copyrights to “consult with the Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce”). I explore the interagency 
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variety of patent policy positions: some OSG positions conflict with the 
Patent Office’s practices; some OSG rationales are inconsistent with the 
Patent Office’s reasoning; and some OSG outcomes endorse the Patent 
Office’s unenacted, untested, and potentially-controversial policy 
preferences. In short, the Solicitor General’s Office is an odd candidate 
for the special solicitude that it appears to enjoy. 
The Supreme Court’s apparent practice of deferring to the Solicitor 
General, thereby shifting the locus of Executive Branch patent 
policymaking to OSG, thus merits further scrutiny. The Patent Office, 
faced with a reviewing court that has expressed severe skepticism of 
agency deference, has rarely attempted to exercise substantive 
policymaking power. This is so even though its statutory powers might 
be understood as conferring (at least some) policymaking power on the 
Patent Office.24 Instead, the Patent Office issues—at best—nonbinding 
guidelines. Or it informally channels its substantive expertise and policy 
preferences to the Supreme Court by way of the Solicitor’s General 
Office. There is, of course, significant value to ensuring that OSG’s 
arguments are informed by the Patent Office’s expertise, and OSG may 
offer the Patent Office a useful channel for challenging the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretations of patent law.25 But OSG has the final word. In 
short, the Solicitor General’s Office has, by way of its role coordinating 
the Executive Branch’s participation in litigation, been thrust into the 
position of effectively making patent policy. And though OSG is ill-
equipped to make policy on its own and in the first instance, the Court 
nevertheless often seems content to defer to the arguments advanced by 
the Solicitor General. In other contexts, such deference to the Executive 
Branch may be appropriate because the Solicitor General conveys to the 
Court the underlying, procedurally-compliant, and well-considered 
views of an expert agency anointed by Congress to set policy.26 Not so 
here: The Patent Office often has no authoritative policy views, and the 
                                                   
conflict dimension of the Solicitor General’s role in greater depth in another project, entitled 
Structuring Intraexecutive Patent Conflict. 
24. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(A), 316(a)(4) (2018); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 
579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016); Neer, supra note 17, at 422 & n.69 (2019); Sarah Tran, 
Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 609, 614 n.29 (2012). 
25. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as Prime Percolator: A Prescription for Appellate 
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009) (contending that the 
Supreme Court plays a valuable role in “percolating” Federal Circuit rules); cf. John F. Duffy & 
Craig A. Nard, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623 
(2007) (suggesting that more circuits, beyond only the Federal Circuit, should have jurisdiction over 
patent claims); Dmitry Karshtedt, Acceptance Instead of Denial: Pro-Applicant Positions at the 
PTO, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 324 (2017) (suggesting that the Patent Office directly 
advocate against its internal decisions to challenge Federal Circuit precedent). 
26. Lemos, supra note 19, at 187 (“[T]he SG’s intervention is more legalistic than political.”). 
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Solicitor General is neither empowered nor best-placed to make them. 
The Supreme Court’s implicit regime of patent deference has no clothes. 
These shortcomings counsel in favor of a Patent Office that exercises 
more policymaking power. 
One might suggest, instead, that the Supreme Court revisit its latent 
patent deference regime. But the Court itself is no more expert than the 
Solicitor General in issues of patent and innovation policy. And to the 
extent this expertise deficit motivates its deference to the Executive 
Branch,27 it would seem odd to advocate for substantial changes to the 
Court’s mode of judicial review (at least, of course, without more 
fundamental changes to the Court’s own substantive expertise).28 
 
Another possible locus for such change may be the Solicitor 
General’s Office itself. That Office might, for example, be required to 
receive public comment from private actors and interested agencies alike 
before responding to the Court’s calls for amicus help. But such process 
reforms cannot address other objections to the Court’s deference to the 
Solicitor General, including those related to the absence of any 
legislative delegation, OSG’s relative political independence, and the 
problems of litigation as a forum for policymaking, among others. And 
correcting for these problems might have the effect of undermining the 
institutional strengths—independence from short-term political 
influence, for example—that help make OSG a stable, trusted advisor to 
the Supreme  Court.29 
The best option, in my view, is a Patent Office that looks more like its 
counterparts across the administrative state—one which makes policy 
decisions by way of regular administrative process, and which defends 
those decisions (with the Solicitor General’s “legalistic” assistance) 
before the Judiciary.30 The Patent Office is Congress’s delegee on 
questions of intellectual property policy.31 The Patent Office is, 
                                                   
27. See Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1092 (“[A]gency interpretations prevail most 
frequently . . . in areas where the Justices perceive themselves as least competent to handle the 
substantive issues, areas such as . . . intellectual property.”); cf. Thompson & Wachtell, supra note 
11, at 281. 
28. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1744 (2013) (explaining how it is “incoherent” to “posit[] nonideal motivations for purposes 
of diagnosis and then posit[] idealized motivations for purposes of prescription”). 
29. See, e.g., SALOKAR, supra note 2, at 94; see also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 254–56. 
30. See Lemos, supra note 19, at 187. 
31. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(8)–(12) (explaining that the Patent 
Office “shall advise the President,” the “Secretary of Commerce,” and other federal “departments 
and agencies” “on matters of intellectual property policy”); see also Neer, supra note 17, at 422 & 
n.69. 
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comparatively, the more expert option.32 The Patent Office’s political 
leadership can be made to account (by the President, and, by extension, 
the public) for its policy decisions.33 And the Patent Office can use well-
established administrative process to arrive at its policy conclusions.34 
Hence, I conclude that the Patent Office should exercise more 
policymaking power, and those policy conclusions that should be 
evaluated under the Court’s formal deference doctrines. This allocation 
of authority helps to improve Executive Branch decisionmaking. Under 
the current regime, policymaking and policy defense have collapsed into 
a single action at a non-ideal site—the Solicitor General’s Office. 
Instead, the Patent Office should set policy and OSG should defend 
those decisions as appropriate (as in most other matters of agency 
regulation). Of course, Patent Office policymaking may itself be an 
imperfect solution in some situations, especially in cases presenting 
interagency conflict, such as Myriad. But the Patent Office is the best of 
the possibilities considered here. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. 
First, I extend the descriptive claim, advanced by John Duffy, 
Rebecca Eisenberg, as well as Lauren Baer and William Eskridge 
(among others), that the Supreme Court effectively defers to the 
Solicitor General in a wide variety of patent cases.35 These cases present, 
as I describe below, a range of intra-Executive postures, from conflict 
with the Patent Office to interpretative views that seem outside the scope 
of executive authority.36 But the SG’s merits-stage briefing across all 
such scenarios nevertheless remains critically influential and 
important.37 This is especially so in cases, such as Myriad, where the 
                                                   
32. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 7, at 1278; Jarrod Shobe, Agency Legislative History, 68 EMORY 
L.J. 283, 302 n.72 (2018); Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2012. 
33. See Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
34. E.g., Wasserman, supra note 15, at 1964–65. 
35. See Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1111–13; Duffy, supra note 12, at 544 (describing a 
shift in policymaking authority “from the judiciary to the executive branch”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court has often resolved patent 
cases “in accordance with the Solicitor General’s advice”); see also Colleen V. Chien, Patent 
Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 395, 429–30 (2011); Ben Picozzi, The Government’s Fire Dispatcher: The Solicitor General 
in Patent Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 433 (2015); Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent 
Court”: A Newly Robust Ecosystem, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 386, 389 (2013). 
36. See infra section I.B. 
37. I clarify, however, that the extent of this deference has varied somewhat in recent years, 
especially at the certiorari stage. Compare Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a 
Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1345, 1381, 1404–05 (2018) (describing recent trends at the 
certiorari stage), with infra section I.B (describing OSG’s merits-stage participation in various 
cases). 
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Court might expect to see the Executive Branch clarify legal ambiguity 
through policy discretion. 
Second, drawing on the literature studying the Solicitor General’s 
Office as well as that on agency deference, I compare the Court’s 
apparent practice of deferring to the Solicitor General in patent cases to 
the usual rationales for judicial deference to the Executive Branch. In so 
doing, I aim to help expand the patent literature’s connection with a 
broader range of administrative law concerns: I build upon the existing 
administrative law oriented studies of the Patent Office, focusing on 
expertise-related matters, while drawing upon other values, too.38 For 
example, cases like Chevron and Mead suggest that courts defer in view 
of executive agencies’ accumulated expertise, but also because the 
Executive’s agents may be held to account for their decisions through 
elections (among other reasons).39 Likewise, the Court’s decision in 
Kisor emphasizes that (in addition to expertise) both congressional 
delegation and public deliberation matter, too.40 Cases like Chenery and 
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital further explain that courts 
must not defer to litigation positions that vary from the Executive 
Branch’s original rationales for policy action.41 
The Solicitor General falls short on these metrics. Outside its 
participation in the Supreme Court’s patent docket, OSG has little 
experience with substantive patent law and policy. OSG’s reputation and 
standing with the Supreme Court is itself derived from the Office’s 
relative independence from short-term political influence.42 And the SG 
has, on multiple occasions, advanced litigating positions that vary from 
the Patent Office’s actions.43 Indeed, such litigation-specific rationales 
                                                   
38. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?: What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 308–20 (2007) (focusing on 
expertise and capture); Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2007–18 (same). 
39. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
40. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
41. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1988); SEC v. Chenery Corp. 
(Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also Lemos, supra note 19, at 206 n.68 (“Bowen . . . means 
that strong Chevron deference will not apply to positions advanced for the first time in the SG’s 
briefs.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958–59 
(2007) (“Chenery provides a structural check for the very presumptions of agency accountability, 
rationality, and expertise upon which Chevron deference is based.”). 
42. See, e.g., SALOKAR, supra note 2, at 94; see also BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
INFLUENCES, supra note 20, at 91; CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 256–54; Black & Owens, A Built-In 
Advantage, supra note 20, at 461. 
43. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 594 (2013) 
(explaining that the Solicitor General’s arguments before the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
“undercut[]” the Patent Office’s preexisting practice of granting patent applications claiming 
naturally occurring DNA). 
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appear to have helped sway the Court in cases such as Myriad and 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.44 
Third, I consider the implications of the SG’s extensive—but perhaps 
unwarranted—influence over patent policy. Given the flimsy 
foundations for the Court’s de facto deference to the Solicitor General, I 
consider possible reforms to OSG, including the possibility of adding 
procedural controls to OSG’s decisionmaking processes. Controls like 
those found in the Administrative Procedure Act would address some of 
the defects described in the second part. But not all of them. 
Implementing such reforms, moreover, may be infeasible—or even 
undesirable for reasons unrelated to patent law. I therefore turn instead 
to the Patent Office, and consider the possibility that the Patent Office 
exercise substantive policymaking power. John Golden, Arti Rai, and 
Melissa Wasserman, among other scholars, have considered the 
appropriate scope of the Patent Office’s policymaking power, and have 
studied which formal deference doctrine, Chevron or Skidmore, should 
apply to Patent Office determinations.45 But the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding implicit deference to the Executive Branch suggests a 
slightly different frame for this debate: Taking the Court’s proclivity to 
defer to the Executive Branch as constant, the more foundational 
question, in my view, is where within that Branch principal 
responsibility over patent policy should lie. That is, I ask not whether the 
Patent Office can exercise power over policy, or the extent to which the 
Patent Office’s policy determinations should receive deferential 
treatment—but rather, who inside the Executive Branch must make 
patent policy in the first instance, and how. The answer is the Patent 
Office, by way of regular agency process. The Court should therefore 
carefully review the basis for the Executive’s advocacy in patent cases, 
deferring only when appropriate, and otherwise referring unresolved 
questions back to the Patent Office under the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, in order to improve the legitimacy and quality of executive 
patent policymaking.46 
Finally, I conclude with several observations that put the Court’s 
relationship with the Solicitor General in the context of the recent 
debates over judicial deference. I suggest that one aspect of the recent 
                                                   
44. 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); see Myriad, 569 U.S. 576; see also infra sections I.B.1 
and I.B.2. 
45. See John Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 
(2016); Rai, supra note 7, at 1278; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2012. 
46. Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part); see Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 361 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (similar, but for the FCC); see also Golden, supra note 45, at 1696 (describing the 
Patent Office’s authority as a “variant of ‘primary jurisdiction’”). 
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critiques of doctrines such as Auer and Chevron centers on some cases—
including some patent cases—where the advocating agent does not 
appear to have earned the deference accorded to it by the Judiciary. That 
is, deference to the Executive Branch seems “reflexive” rather than 
appropriately grounded in such factors as “agency expertise” and 
“administrative experience.”47 Thus, in my view, the Deference Question 
is not whether deference is appropriate but when. And the patent 
experience suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that a studied return to 
deference’s foundations helps to provide an answer. 
I. DE FACTO DEFERENCE 
A.  Deference De Jure 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council provides a starting 
point for the modern doctrine governing judicial review of—and judicial 
deference to—executive agency action.48 One typical hornbook account 
of Chevron follows three steps, numbered zero through two.49 First, at 
“Step Zero,” a reviewing court considers whether Congress has granted 
the agency the authority to administer a statutory program by issuing 
decisions carrying the force of law.50 If so, then the court moves on to 
consider Chevron’s Steps One and Two. 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question 
                                                   
47.  Compare Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), with SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)). 
48.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
49.  There is, to be sure, quite a bit of “choreographic confusion” over exactly how many steps 
are in the analysis. See Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 757, 759–60 (collecting descriptions of Chevron that range from one step to four). 
I do not mean to suggest that this three-step account is the best description of Chevron doctrine 
today. But this three-step account does account for much of the current Chevron literature, see, e.g., 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006), and, perhaps more 
importantly, succinctly encapsulates the features of Chevron deference that are relevant to my 
account of the Supreme Court’s implicit deference to the Solicitor General in patent cases. 
50.  Merrill & Hickman, supra note 49, at 912–13; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229–31 (2001); see also Sunstein supra note 49, at 193. 
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for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.51 
Stated simply, the questions for the reviewing court are: (1) does the 
agency have authority to administer the statute; (2) if so, has Congress 
directed the agency to act in some specific manner; and (3) if Congress 
has not so directed, is the agency’s exercise of congressionally-conferred 
discretion reasonable? If the duly-authorized agency’s interpretation of 
the ambiguous statute is reasonable, then the court must defer to the 
agency’s view. 
The Supreme Court offered three rationales for this mandatory 
deference. One, statutory ambiguity may reflect Congress’s intent to 
delegate (perhaps implicitly) interpretative authority to an agency.52 
Two, as compared to the courts, agencies have greater expertise to 
decide what is, say, “reasonable” in respect to technical questions of 
environmental or telecommunications policy.53 And three, agency 
officials, unlike courts, may be held to account for their policy decisions 
through presidential control, and, ultimately, presidential election.54 In 
short, executive agencies often have a fair amount of leeway to 
administer their own regulatory programs by interpreting ambiguous 
statutes in view of their technical expertise and the President’s policy 
aims. 
But what if, at Step Zero, a reviewing court concludes that Congress 
did not grant an agency the authority to issue legally binding rules? Even 
then the court may defer to an agency, in view of that agency’s 
expertise, thoroughness, and consistency (among other considerations). 
The Supreme Court explained in Skidmore that, even where agency 
decisions are “not controlling upon the courts,” those agency “rulings, 
interpretations and opinions” “do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts . . . may properly resort for 
guidance.”55 Indeed, in Mead—the decision that sets out Chevron’s Step 
Zero—the Court found Chevron’s framework inapplicable, but 
nevertheless remanded for consideration under Skidmore.56 
                                                   
51. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
52. Id. at 965; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 995–98 (2013). But see, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable 
Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (2014) (suggesting that such implied congressional 
delegation to agencies is a legal fiction). 
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
54. Id. 865–66. 
55. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
56. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
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Chevron and Skidmore, then, present two related (though distinct) 
doctrines of de jure deference. If an agency has the authority to 
administer an ambiguous statute, then courts must defer to that agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of that statute. And Congress, it seems, 
understands this: Legislators “draft in Chevron’s shadow,” sometimes 
leaving “gaps” for the agency to fill.57 And even where an agency lacks 
formal authority to administer a statute, reviewing courts may 
nevertheless defer to an agency interpretation that has the “power to 
persuade” in view of the agency’s expertise, deliberative processes, and 
consistency over time, among other factors.58 
Here’s the upshot: If either Chevron or Skidmore applies, executive 
agencies can exercise significant authority over the rules and policies 
within their domain. There are, to be sure, significant and important 
differences between the two. For one, where Chevron applies, deference 
is mandatory; where Skidmore applies, deference turns on the agency’s 
persuasive power. And while cases following in Chevron’s 
jurisprudential lineage embrace an agency’s policy flexibility, Skidmore 
expressly values an agency’s “consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements.”59 But these differences notwithstanding, these 
deference doctrines collectively recognize the Executive Branch’s 
comparative advantages along several dimensions—expertise, 
deliberative capacity, political accountability, and democratic 
legitimacy, among others—and they empower agencies to issue 
substantive rules or to offer the courts substantial guidance accordingly. 
B. Deference De Facto 
The standard account of patent doctrine is quite unlike these 
deference regimes. Instead, this account suggests that substantive patent 
rules are made in Congress and in the Judiciary—and not in the 
Executive Branch.60 That account is, from one narrow perspective, 
descriptively accurate. Congress, of course, has passed a wide range of 
patent statutes.61 And though those provisions empower the U.S. Patent 
                                                   
57. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 52, at 995–98; see also infra notes 219–220 and accompanying 
text. 
58. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
59. Compare, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005), with Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
60. E.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1791, 1828 (2013) (noting that “a strong claim can be made that power over [patent policy] is 
consolidated in the Federal Circuit”). But see id. at 1823–27 (describing some executive branch 
influence over patent policy). 
61. Some examples include the Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) and 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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and Trademark Office (an executive agency) to review patent 
applications, issue patents, and make related determinations, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the near-exclusive arbiter of patent 
appeals—has never deferred to the Patent Office’s views on substantive 
patent doctrine under Chevron.62 Indeed, the Federal Circuit could barely 
have been more emphatic that, in its view (and perhaps to protect its own 
jurisdictional terrain63), the Patent Office lacks the power to make 
substantive patent rules: Even “the broadest of the [Patent Office]’s 
rulemaking powers . . . do[] NOT grant the [Patent] Commissioner the 
authority to issue substantive rules.”64 The Federal Circuit has similarly 
declined to defer to the Patent Office’s views under Skidmore, too.65 
Instead, the Judiciary—including, especially, the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court—has shouldered the burden of construing and 
authoritatively interpreting Congress’s directives. 
But if we view the Executive Branch through a wider lens, the 
standard account seems flawed. The Solicitor General has exercised an 
important and powerful influence over the Supreme Court’s merits 
determinations in patent cases. Lauren Baer and William Eskridge, for 
example, have suggested that the Court “consultative[ly] defer[s]” to the 
Executive Branch, finding that OSG’s amicus briefs are “particularly 
influential” in patent cases.66 Other scholars have described similar 
results.67 John Duffy finds that the Supreme Court often—and 
sometimes expressly—“embrac[es] legal tests and holdings that bear 
remarkable resemblance to the tests articulated by the Solicitor General,” 
highlighting several cases, including Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I68 and Microsoft v. AT&T.69 I take a close look at these 
                                                   
62. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 1971. 
63. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1064, 
1068–74 (2017) (describing the “turf wars” between the agency and the court “over what deference was 
owed”); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 60, at 1820; cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 38, at 299–301. 
64. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original); see 
also Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But see Cuozzo Speed 
Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (noting that the Patent Act “does not 
clearly contain the [Federal] Circuit’s claimed limitation” “to procedural rules” (emphasis omitted)). 
65. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 760 F. App’x 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
66. Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1111–13. 
67. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 35, at 429–30; Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 29 (2007) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has often resolved patent cases “in accordance with the Solicitor General’s 
advice”); Picozzi, supra note 35, at 433; Rai, supra note 35, at 389; see also Michael E. Solimine, 
The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1212 (2013) (describing “[t]he Court’s [c]ontinuum of [d]eference to the 
Solicitor General’s [a]micus [b]riefs” across subject areas). 
68. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
69. Duffy, supra note 12, at 541 (highlighting Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) and Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) as examples of OSG’s influence). John Duffy also 
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cases (among others) and likewise conclude that the Supreme Court 
frequently defers substantially, if only implicitly, to the views advanced 
by the Solicitor General. 
The result is a longstanding regime of de facto deference.70 In cases 
that present legalistic issues, or where the Court discerns a clear 
statutory command, the Court may decide the matter for itself. But in 
cases that may turn on policy judgments in the face of legal ambiguity, 
the Court has frequently adopted the views of the Executive Branch. 
Remarkably, as I describe below, the Court exhibits this deference 
across a range of circumstances. First, such deference appears where the 
Patent Office and the Office of the Solicitor General disagree. Second, it 
seems to apply even where OSG has replaced the Patent Office’s stated 
rationale with some new, litigation-specific justification. And, third, the 
Court even seems to let the Patent Office launder its policy preferences 
through OSG without complying with the administrative processes that 
must typically attend to agency policymaking.71 
1. Deference Despite OSG and Patent Office Conflict 
I begin with Myriad. In 2009, several doctors, patients, and advocacy 
groups sought a judgment declaring invalid Myriad’s BRCA-related 
patents—patents covering genes that help predict someone’s risk of 
developing breast and ovarian cancer.72 Typically, “products of nature” 
are not patentable.73 But the Patent Office defended its practice of 
granting patent applications claiming isolated DNA molecules: It 
contended that “isolated genes are chemicals” and such chemicals 
comprise patentable subject matter because their status as “isolated” 
renders them different from their state “as they are found in nature.”74 
The district court, however, concluded that the molecules were produced 
by nature and hence unpatentable.75 
                                                   
highlights Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) and Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). Duffy, supra note 12, at 541. 
70. Cf. Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1184 (suggesting that the Court clarify its deference 
regime and incorporate instances of informal “consultative deference” into its usual forms of 
doctrinal  deference). 
71. See Clarisa Long, PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 
1988 (2009) (explaining that the Patent Office is becoming a “more aggressive” “supplier of legal 
rules” but noting the transparency-related concerns that attend to this mode of rulemaking). 
72. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 586 (2013). 
73. Id. at 589. 
74. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant U. S. Patent and Trademark Office at 23–25, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS)). 
75. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 232. 
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Department of Justice took 
control of the litigation and (at the urging of other agencies, including 
the National Institutes of Health) reversed course.76 OSG acknowledged 
that its new position was “contrary to the longstanding practice of the 
[Patent Office], as well as the practice of . . . government agencies 
that . . . sought and obtained patents for isolated genomic DNA,” but 
noted that the case “prompted the United States to reevaluate” its 
position.77 The Patent Office, however, “remained firmly behind its 
policy.”78 
The Federal Circuit sided with the Patent Office, concluding that the 
patents were valid. And the intra-Executive divide played an important 
role in the Federal Circuit’s resolution of the case. Though the majority 
noted that OSG declined to “defend the [Patent Office’s] longstanding 
position that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible,” the Court of 
Appeals explained that its own approach “comports” with that 
“longstanding practice,” and that any policy change must come from 
Congress.79 The concurrence, moreover, reasoned that the Patent 
Office’s practice had engendered industry reliance interests that also 
counseled in favor of patentability.80 
To be sure, the Federal Circuit’s decision does not formally defer 
under either Chevron or Skidmore to the Patent Office’s guidance 
documents. But Judge Bryson, in partial dissent, nevertheless accused 
the majority of “defer[ring]” to the Patent Office in view of “the fact that 
since 2001 the [agency] has had guidelines in place that have allowed 
patents on entire human genes.”81 And, in Judge Bryson’s view, this 
deference (such as it was) was especially unwarranted in light of the 
intra-Executive conflict: 
[W]hatever force the [Patent Office]’s views on the issue of 
patent eligibility may have had in the past has, at the very least, 
been substantially undermined by the position the government 
has taken in this case. The Department of Justice filed a brief on 
                                                   
76. See Park, supra note 23, at 526. 
77. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 
2010-1406). 
78. Park, supra note 23, at 526. 
79. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1349, 1354. To be sure, the Patent Office’s 
position was barely reasoned. See id. at 1380 (explaining that the Patent Office’s guidelines were 
“perfunctory”). And that should matter for deference’s purposes. See infra section II.A.3. But that 
the Patent Office’s guidelines were perfunctory is hardly any reason to shift decisionmaking 
authority to OSG. Instead, as I describe below, the better practice is for the court to remand to the 
agency for a better agency deliberative process. See infra section III.C. 
80. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354; id. at 1368, 1370 (Moore, J., concurring). 
81. Id. at 1380 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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behalf of the United States in this court taking the position that 
Myriad’s gene claims (other than the cDNA claims) are not 
patent-eligible. Although the [Patent Office] did not “sign” the 
brief and we are left to guess about the status of any possible 
continuing interagency disagreements about the issue, the 
Department of Justice speaks for the Executive Branch, and the 
[Patent Office] is part of the Executive Branch, so it is fair to 
assume that the Executive Branch has modified its position from 
the one taken by the [Patent Office] in its 2001 guidelines and, 
informally, before that.82 
Moreover, Judge Bryson reasoned that the Patent Office’s “lac[k] [of] 
substantive rulemaking authority” undermined the majority’s reliance on 
the agency’s past practice.83 Judge Bryson also found the Patent Office’s 
“perfunctory” 2001 guidelines to “not reflect [the] thorough 
consideration” that is a precondition to judicial deference.84 And, finally, 
Judge Bryson explained that “Congress has not accorded” “lawmaking 
authority” on the Patent Office.85 
As I suggested in the Introduction (and as I elaborate infra 
section II.A), this dialogue among the majority, the concurrence, and the 
dissent sounds in the values that form the basis for deference. In noting 
that “Congress has not accorded” “lawmaking authority” on the Patent 
Office, for example, Judge Bryson highlights deference’s delegation 
theory, suggesting that deference may not be appropriate where 
Congress has declined to delegate policymaking power to a particular 
agency.86 Likewise, in describing the 2001 guidelines as “perfunctory” 
and commenting on the Patent Office’s lack of “rulemaking authority,” 
Judge Bryson asks whether the guidelines are truly the product of an 
agency’s reasoned deliberation.87 And, in trying to discern which agency 
“speaks for the Executive Branch,” Judge Bryson draws from 
accountability theories of deference.88 
                                                   
82. Id. at 1380–81. 
83. Id. at 1380. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1381. 
86. Id. To be sure, Judge Bryson seems mistaken to suggest that the Patent Office lacks the 
delegated authority to set patent policy. Judge Bryson’s view is correct under the then-prevailing 
Federal Circuit precedent. But as I’ve noted above (and below), the Supreme Court has since called 
the Federal Circuit’s view into question, suggesting that the Patent Office may indeed have the 
authority to set substantive rules. See, e.g., supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. And, as 
Melissa Wasserman has suggested, the Patent Office certainly seems able to set substantive patent 
policy through adjudication at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Wasserman, supra note 15; cf. 
Vishnubhakat, supra note 18. 
87. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1380. 
88. Id. 
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Though the Patent Office’s past practice proved persuasive at the 
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case and was 
ultimately swayed by the Solicitor General’s view. Myriad asked the 
Court to defer to the Patent Office’s “past practice of awarding gene 
patents.”89 But the Court declined to do so, noting that Congress had not 
expressly “endorsed the views of the [Patent Office],” and that the 
Solicitor General’s contrary arguments both “undercut[] the [Patent 
Office’s] practice” and “weigh against deferring” to the Patent Office.90 
Indeed, not only did OSG’s presence at the Court “undercut” the 
Patent Office’s practice—OSG’s preferred outcome carried the day. As I 
noted in the Introduction, the Solicitor General contended that “isolated 
but otherwise unmodified DNA is not patent-eligible” (though 
“[s]ynthesized genetic materials” ought to be treated as “patent-
eligible . . . because they do not occur in nature”).91 Arti Rai, among 
others, has explained that this distinction—between isolated DNA and 
synthetic cDNA—is suspect: “From a formal scientific or legal 
perspective, the distinction . . . is not entirely compelling.”92 This is 
because neither is truly naturally occurring; rather, each requires some 
substantial human intervention. But, from a “policy standpoint,” this 
may seem one reasonable approach—one which balances concerns for 
patent thickets against adequate incentives to invest in genetic 
diagnostics and therapeutics.93 And it is this approach that the Court in 
fact adopted: “[A] naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of 
nature and not patent eligible,” but “[synthetically created DNA] . . . is 
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”94 In short, 
determining what, exactly, is patent-eligible presents the familiar 
difficulty of line-drawing.95 And in the face of that difficulty, the 
                                                   
89. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 593 (2013). 
90. Id. at 594. 
91. Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
92. Rai, supra note 7, at 1258–60 (“From a formal scientific or legal perspective, the 
distinction . . . is not entirely compelling. . . . From a policy standpoint, however, the U.S. 
government’s distinction has some appeal.”); see also Dreyfuss, Nielsen & Nicol, supra note 7, at 
571 (explaining that Australia’s High Court rejected a similar distinction because both types of 
DNA bear the same relevant characteristics). 
93. Rai, supra note 7, at 1258–60. 
94. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 580. 
95. Rai, supra note 7, at 1258–60; see also Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of 
Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1407–10. Here, the line drawing challenge 
pertains to the standard for “naturally occurring” substances. The DNA sequences in question exist 
in nature—but they might never exist as a stand-alone substance (rather than as part of some larger 
sequence). Do substances that exist in nature—but never on their own—count as naturally 
occurring? See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (analogizing the question to that of “elemental lithium,” which “does not 
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Supreme Court adopted OSG’s view—notwithstanding the Patent 
Office’s contrary (and similarly scientifically reasonable) position.96 
2. Deference Despite OSG and Patent Office Inconsistency 
The Court’s decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies offers one further 
important and notable example of the Supreme Court’s deference to the 
Executive Branch.97 Indeed, Cuozzo is a rare example of the Court 
extending formal, de jure deference (under Chevron) in a patent case.98 
But as I describe in detail here, the Court’s decision to invoke Chevron 
(ostensibly to the Patent Office) hinges on an OSG argument that is 
nowhere to be found in the Patent Office rule under review. In short, the 
Court defers to the Solicitor General’s view, notwithstanding a 
significant inconsistency between OSG’s litigation-specific rationale and 
the Patent Office’s reasoning—indeed, the Court’s decision in this case 
seems to violate its usual doctrines against crediting post hoc 
rationalizations.99 
Cuozzo challenged several aspects of inter partes review—an 
administrative proceeding designed to allow the Patent Office to take a 
“second look” at a patent after having initially granted the patent’s 
application.100 Cuozzo asked the Court to review, among other features, 
the Patent Office’s legal standard for construing the scope of the 
challenged patent.101 The Patent Office had decided to evaluate the 
validity of a patent’s claims under their “broadest reasonable 
interpretation”—the same standard that the Patent Office applies when, 
say, examining a patent application for the first time.102 But Cuozzo 
would have preferred that the Patent Office apply the Phillips standard—
the standard used by the district courts to evaluate a granted 
patent’s validity.103 
Cuozzo’s contentions sharply divided the Federal Circuit. The panel 
majority concluded primarily that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
                                                   
occur naturally because it reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature only as part of a 
chemical compound”). 
96. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
97. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
98. Id. at 2142–46; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that “the Federal 
Circuit . . . has never deferred to the Patent Office’s views on substantive patent doctrine under 
Chevron”). 
99. E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
100. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
101. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
102. Id. at 1275. 
103. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2134. 
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(the Act which gave rise to the inter partes review proceedings at the 
heart of Cuozzo’s challenges) required that the Patent Office’s apply the 
“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard.104 But five judges 
dissented from the Court of Appeals’ denial of Cuozzo’s petition for 
rehearing en banc, reaching a starkly opposite conclusion: They read the 
Act as mandating Phillips.105  
Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s Office defended 
the Patent Office’s practice—but on significantly different terms. Where 
the Federal Circuit suggested that the Act implicitly compelled the 
Patent Office to apply the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, 
the Solicitor General argued that the Patent Office’s choice was one 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute: “The [Patent Office] 
has reasonably decided to use its longstanding broadest-reasonable-
[interpretation] approach in inter partes review proceedings.”106 That is, 
the Solicitor General argued that the Chevron framework governed the 
question and, under Chevron’s second step, the agency’s interpretation 
was reasonable. 
The Solicitor General’s position was based, in part, on the Patent 
Office’s view; the Solicitor General, after all, defended the agency’s 
choice of substantive standard.107 In short, there was no obvious policy 
conflict between OSG and the Patent Office. 
But the Solicitor General’s argument diverged substantially from the 
original rationale for the Patent Office’s regulation. As noted, the 
Solicitor General primarily framed the Patent Office’s rule as reasonable 
under Chevron.108 That is, OSG described the agency’s rule as informed 
by the Patent Office’s “expert judgment” and hence deserving of 
                                                   
104. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d at 1278 (“We conclude that Congress implicitly 
approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.”). The Federal Circuit 
also added that, if it were wrong as to Congress’s clear intent, the Patent Office’s regulation was a 
reasonable measure under Chevron. Id. at 1279. 
105. Id. at 1303 (Prost, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[In inter partes 
review], as in district court litigation, an already issued claim is being analyzed solely for the 
purposes of determining its validity. In this context, it makes little sense to evaluate the claim 
against the prior art based on anything than the claim’s actual meaning.”). 
106. Indeed, this was the Government’s opening statement at oral argument. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 26, Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446) (statement of Curtis E. 
Gannon, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice). 
107. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP.: FISCAL 
YEAR 2016, at 20 (2016) (noting the Patent Office’s role in defending the agency’s regulation before 
the Supreme Court). 
108. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 106, at 26; see also Brief for Respondent at 
34–42, Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1165967 [hereinafter Cuozzo 
Respondent Brief]. To be sure, OSG also defended the Federal Circuit’s main holding on its own 
terms. But the primary thrust of the Solicitor General’s argument, as evinced by, for example, oral 
argument in the case, centered on the regulation’s reasonableness under Chevron. 
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“judicial deference.”109 In short, OSG argued that the choice among 
standards is a “policy matter” best left to the “particular expertise of the 
Patent  Office.”110 
A closer look at the Patent Office’s regulation, however, hardly 
reflects such a policy choice (as opposed to an interpretative view). The 
Patent Office’s regulation seems to rest upon the view that Congress 
implicitly commanded the Patent Office to apply the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard: The agency’s order reasons that “the provisions 
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act indicate that the” “broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard” “should apply . . . to [inter partes 
review] proceedings,” and that the Act’s “legislative history” “is further 
consistent” with that standard.111 Stated simply, the agency’s original 
view was—like the Federal Circuit majority—that the statute mandated 
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. But in the context of the 
Supreme Court’s review, the Solicitor General reframed the Patent 
Office’s interpretation of the America Invents Act as a reasonable 
policy  choice. 
The Solicitor General’s strategy proved successful. The Supreme 
Court agreed that Congress had expressly granted the Patent Office the 
authority to issue “regulations . . . governing inter partes review.”112 
And, finding that “[n]o statutory provision unambiguously directs the 
agency to use one standard or the other,” the Court concluded that the 
agency’s choice was reasonable in view of the several policy rationales 
described in the Solicitor General’s brief, including, for example, that 
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard would ease 
administrability (given that the same standard applied in nearly every 
other Patent Office proceeding), and therefore declined to consider 
which claim construction standard was “better . . . as a policy matter.”113 
But the Patent Office likewise never publicly considered this policy 
question. Instead, its public reasoning reflected, as noted above, an 
interpretative view—not a policy call. 
Other cases suggest similar results under similar conditions. 
Consider, for example, the Court’s decision regarding the doctrine of 
obviousness in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.114 There, the 
Patent Office was able to win a change to the standard governing its 
review of patent applications by laundering its preferences through 
                                                   
109. Cuozzo Respondent Brief, supra note 108, at 41. 
110. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2146. 
111. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,679 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
112. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2142 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2018)). 
113. Id. at 2142, 2146. 
114. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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OSG—without ever having to subject those policy views to standard 
administrative  procedures. 
The case asked the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s 
standard for assessing obviousness: According to the Court of Appeals, 
an invention was obvious only if “‘some motivation or suggestion to 
combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art.”115 And 
the Federal Circuit applied this “teaching, suggestion, or motivation,” or 
“TSM,” “test” rigidly, requiring that the prior art offer “precise teachings 
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim,” and 
emphasizing, as prior art, only “published articles” and 
“issued  patents.”116 
The Solicitor General urged the Court to grant certiorari, explaining 
that the case presented an important issue of patent law, and that the 
Federal Circuit’s decision wrongly imposed upon the Patent Office an 
“inflexible requirement” for proving obviousness.117 The Court granted 
the petition in KSR on the Solicitor General’s recommendation.118 
On the merits, OSG reiterated its belief that the Court “should not 
adopt th[e] flawed categorical [TSM] test as the exclusive means of 
determining” obviousness.119 
But as the Solicitor General argued for the end of the TSM test, the 
Patent Office continued to apply it in its own review of patent 
applications.120 In short, OSG’s advocacy did not match the Patent 
Office’s practices, notwithstanding the agency’s authority to establish 
regulations governing its review of patent applications.121 Instead, the 
Patent Office circumvented questions about the scope of that authority 
by helping OSG urge the Supreme Court to abandon the test. In its 
Annual Report, the Patent Office explained that it “assisted the Solicitor 
General’s Office in preparing the government’s amicus curiae brief on 
the merits, arguing that the Supreme Court should reverse Federal 
                                                   
115. Id. at 407 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
116. Id. at 418–19. 
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 548 U.S. 902 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 1455388. 
118. KSR Int’l Co., 548 U.S. 902.  
119. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) [hereinafter KSR Amicus Brief]. 
120. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2143.01 (8th ed., 5th rev., Aug. 2006) (explaining 
that “[o]bviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art 
to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so” 
and that “[t]he  teaching, suggestion, or motivation must be found either explicitly or implicitly in 
the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the 
art”). 
121. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2144 (2016). 
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Circuit precedent and its application of the motivation-suggestion-
teaching test.”122 Indeed, the Solicitor General’s brief draws on policy 
considerations that would be of special concern to the Patent Office. The 
Solicitor General’s brief, for example, explains that the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid test undermines the Patent Office’s expertise and imposes unduly 
burdensome evidentiary requirements on patent examiners, requiring 
them to conduct “extensive search[es]” for prior art that simply state a 
point that would be clear to someone skilled in the relevant field of 
invention.123 Hence, the Patent Office and the Solicitor General’s Office 
argued that the Court should not require such “burdensome” and 
“unnecessary search[es] for evidence showing a particular suggestion, 
teaching, or motivation.”124 
Of course, there is significant value in having OSG’s arguments 
informed by the Patent Office’s expert views, and OSG may offer the 
Patent Office a useful channel for challenging the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretations of patent law.125 But expertise is not all that matters. The 
Patent Office, for example, never tested these arguments in the 
tournament that is notice and comment rulemaking—despite having the 
express authority to “establish regulations . . . [that] shall govern the 
conduct of proceedings in the Office,” including its review of patent 
applications.126 Instead, even as it continued to apply the TSM test, the 
Patent Office pitched a different policy preference to the Solicitor 
General, who relayed it to the Court. 
The Court sided with the Government.127 The Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in KSR, explaining that, as the SG argued, the 
obviousness inquiry should be “expansive and flexible,” not rigid.128 
Moreover, the Court’s decision reflects, in places, OSG’s policy 
arguments: For example, the Court suggests that limits on the Patent 
                                                   
122. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.: FISCAL 
YEAR 2006, at 47 (2006). 
123. See KSR Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 22–23. 
124. Compare id. at 21, 26, with KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-
1350), 2006 WL 2453601. 
125. See Golden, supra note 25 (contending that the Supreme Court plays a valuable role in 
“percolating” Federal Circuit rules); cf. Duffy & Nard, supra note 25 (suggesting that more circuits, 
beyond only the Federal Circuit, should have jurisdiction over patent claims); Karshtedt, supra note 
25, at 324 (suggesting that the Patent Office advocate against its own procedures in order to 
challenge Federal Circuit precedent). 
126. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144; United States v. 
Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019). 
127. Compare KSR Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 23–24 (“This Court should not adopt [the 
Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation (TSM)] test.”), with KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 402 (“[T]he TSM 
test is incompatible with this Court’s precedents.”); see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 539. 
128. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415. 
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Office’s ability to draw upon its expertise undermine “the presumption 
of validity” conferred on issued patents.129 
3. Deference Despite Falling Outside the Patent Office’s Apparent 
Authority 
As noted, Congress has given the Patent Office the authority to 
“establish regulations . . . [that] shall govern the conduct of proceedings 
in the Office,” which might be understood to encompass regulations that 
apply to questions of claim construction, obviousness, or patentability.130 
But the Court’s implicit deference regime seems to reach beyond such 
matters, to questions of infringement—cases that typically regard a 
dispute between two private parties about whether one has infringed 
another’s patent, rather than the more foundational question of what 
patents should issue at all. 
Consider, for example, Microsoft v. AT&T.131 There, AT&T alleged 
that Microsoft Windows, once installed on a computer, infringed an 
AT&T patent.132 AT&T thus sought damages for every personal 
computer manufactured to run the operating system, including 
computers manufactured outside the United States.133 AT&T contended 
that, even where the computer’s manufacture was abroad and where the 
software was installed on foreign soil, Microsoft had nevertheless 
“supplie[d]” the infringing software “component” “from the United 
States,” in violation of the Patent Act’s extraterritorial infringement 
provision at Section 271(f)(1).134 
AT&T’s case thus turned, in part, on the meaning of the term 
“component” as it relates to software.135 The Court, drawing on the 
case’s briefing, explained that the matter “can be conceptualized in (at 
least) two  ways.”136 
                                                   
129. Id. at 426. 
130. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
131. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
132. AT&T v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872(WHP), 2004 WL 406640, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 
2004). 
133. Id. 
134. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2018); see also AT&T, 2004 WL 406640, at *2. 
135. Microsoft identifies two questions critical to its analysis. “First, when, or in what form, does 
software qualify as a ‘component’ under § 271(f)? Second, were ‘components’ of the foreign-made 
computers involved in this case ‘supplie[d]’ by Microsoft ‘from the United States’?” Microsoft, 550 
U.S. at 447 (alterations in original). Here, I explore the Court’s treatment of the term “component” 
in the first question. I have explored the Supreme Court’s analysis of the second question—and, in 
particular, its use of universal, or trans-substantive, canons of statutory interpretation—in more 
detail in other work. See Narechania, supra note 37, at 1379–80. 
136. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 447. 
13 Narechania.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:49 PM 
894 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:869 
 
First, the software “component” might be software “in the abstract”—
computing “instructions” that are “detached from any medium.”137 
AT&T advocated for this view: Because Windows was designed and 
produced by Microsoft in Redmond, Washington, this interpretation 
would require that the software was a “component” “supplied” “from the 
United States” (even if any tangible copies on compact discs or installed 
on the infringing foreign computers’ hard drives were locally 
supplied).138 Though Microsoft agreed that software is simply 
“intangible information,” it nevertheless seemed to contend that such 
intangibles are categorically incapable of being a “component.”139 
Second, the Court explained that the software “component” might 
refer to a “computer-readable” “tangible ‘copy’” of an application.140 
This view reflects OSG’s position. Unlike Microsoft, the Solicitor 
General reasoned that software could indeed be a component of a 
patented invention.141 And unlike AT&T, the Solicitor General 
contended that “software in the abstract cannot be a component of a 
patented invention”—only a “physical copy of the executable software 
code” may be.142 That is, software, when encoded on some tangible 
medium (such as a portable or hard drive), may be a component of some 
larger innovation. 
The Government’s interpretation of the term “component” was 
informed by policy concerns. The Government explained that AT&T’s 
contrary interpretation would “impos[e] liability for a single 
transmission to a foreign country,” thereby denying the domestic 
software industry “any realistic avenue of competing in overseas 
markets without risking [infringement] liability” in domestic courts for 
foreign conduct—even where local laws governing those foreign 
markets would not impose liability for such conduct.143 Meanwhile, 
“companies in other industries that design components in the United 
                                                   
137. Id. at 447–48. 
138. Id. at 448. 
139. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, 15–17, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 549 U.S. 
991 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 403897; see also Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056), 
2006 WL 3693464 [hereinafter Microsoft Amicus Brief] (“[Microsoft] argues that software cannot 
be a ‘component’ because it is ‘intangible information’ rather than a ‘physical product.’” (citation 
omitted)). But see Brief for Petitioner at 13, Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056) (suggesting that 
“physical media” containing software copies could be “components”). Microsoft thus seems to have 
shifted its view on the proper interpretation of component between the petition and merits stages of 
the case. 
140. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 448–49. 
141. Microsoft Amicus Brief, supra note 139, at 11–12. 
142. Id. at 13. 
143. Id. at 25. 
13 Narechania.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:49 PM 
2020] DEFECTIVE PATENT DEFERENCE 895 
 
States can replicate those components abroad without fear of [analogous 
infringement] liability.”144 This, OSG reasoned, “frustrates the goal of a 
technology-neutral statutory scheme.”145 Each of these concerns presents 
a policy conclusion. First, the Government’s position reflects a 
preference against placing domestic companies at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. Second, the 
Government draws from comity concerns to suggest that domestic law 
should not be construed in ways that may conflict with foreign law. And 
third, the Government’s argument reinforces the policy view that patent 
law should be technologically neutral in application.146 
The Court adopted the Government’s view, agreeing that “a copy of 
Windows, [but] not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a ‘component’ 
under § 271(f).”147 And the Court’s opinion confirms the influence of the 
policy concerns advanced by the Solicitor General. The Court, for 
example, explains that comity concerns “tug[] strongly against 
construction of § 271(f) to encompass as a ‘component’ not only a 
physical copy of software, but also software’s intangible code.”148 The 
Court likewise explained that its approach does not vary by industry: Its 
treatment of software in Microsoft is level with the law’s treatment of 
“blueprints, schematics, templates, and prototypes,” among other forms 
of instructions relevant to other industries.149 
Justice Stevens dissented. He conceded that “[s]trong policy 
considerations” favored the majority’s outcome.150 But, in his view, 
AT&T’s construction of the statute—treating even intangible software 
instructions as a “component” within the meaning of the statute—was 
“faithful to the intent of the Congress that enacted § 271(f).”151 
The difference between the majority and the dissent might be 
characterized on Chevron’s terms. The majority begins by explaining 
that software can be understood “in (at least) two ways.”152 And, in the 
                                                   
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. The contention that the interpretation of the patent laws should reflect a technology-neutral 
scheme is itself a policy choice—one that may be belied by, for example, the pharmaceutical-
specific provision at issue in Merck, infra notes 156–175 and accompanying text. See also Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003); 
Narechania, supra note 10, at 1489 (favoring “industry- and context-specific patent tailoring”); cf. 
Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2016) 
(outlining the “policy goals of technology neutrality”). 
147. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 451–52 (2007); see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 542. 
148. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 455–56. 
149. Id. at 457. 
150. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 447 (majority opinion). 
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face of this ambiguity, the Court defers to the Solicitor General’s view. 
That is, the majority appears to conclude, at Chevron’s second step, that 
OSG’s proposed characterization is at least reasonable in view of the 
policy concerns advanced by that Office. Justice Stevens’s dissent, by 
contrast, might be understood to decide the question at Chevron’s first 
step: Even though policy considerations may favor the majority’s view, 
Justice Stevens appears to conclude that “Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”153 
I do not mean to imply that the Court’s opinion formally invokes 
Chevron. Indeed, no opinion in the case cites Chevron, Skidmore, or any 
other related case. And Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion implies that 
its construction of “component,” as applied to software, follows from the 
statute’s plain text.154 But viewed together, Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent offer a striking contrast: one 
proceeds from the evident (in its view) intent of Congress; the other sees 
greater room for discretion, and reaches a decision based, at least in part, 
on policy concerns—the very policy concerns advanced by the 
Solicitor’s General Office. Remarkably, given the apparent limits on the 
Patent Office’s policysetting authority, the Court’s defers even absent 
any obvious reason, under Step Zero, for the Court to defer to the 
Government’s view on matters of infringement in particular. In short, the 
Patent Office’s power to “establish regulations . . . govern[ing] the 
conduct of proceedings in the Office,” would not ordinarily seem to 
extend to statutes such as the extraterritorial infringement provision at 
issue here.155 
The Court’s decision in Merck v. Integra Lifesciences offers a 
similarly representative infringement example.156 There, Merck asked 
the Court to consider the scope of a statutory exception to patent 
infringement.157 Section 271(e)(1) explains that it is not patent 
infringement to “use” a “patented invention” “for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” under the 
federal laws regulating pharmaceutical approvals and manufacturing.158 
But when is a potentially infringing use “reasonably related” to a 
pharmaceutical company’s application to manufacture and sell a new 
drug? 
                                                   
153. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
154. Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 449. 
155. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). 
156. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
157. Id. at 200–02. 
158. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
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Integra contended that certain “preclinical studies” are not 
“reasonably included” in a regulatory application to manufacture and 
sell a drug, and thus such uses fall outside the scope of the statutory 
exception.159 And Integra’s position aligned closely with the Federal 
Circuit decision on review. The Federal Circuit reasoned that, even 
where a pharmaceutical company attempts to “identif[y] the best drug 
candidate to subject to future clinical testing,” the FDA has no 
immediate “interest in th[at] hunt for drugs that may or may not later 
undergo clinical testing.”160 That is, such early, preclinical studies were 
relatively far removed from any subsequent, hypothetical applications 
for regulatory approval. The Federal Circuit’s decision thus limited the 
scope of the exception primarily to studies directly related to 
applications for generic drugs.161 In that court’s view, a generic 
manufacturer could seek FDA approval while the pioneering 
pharmaceutical is still patent-protected in order to launch its substitute as 
soon as the patent expires, but using patented compounds for early new 
drug testing fell outside the exception’s scope. And the Federal Circuit 
further explained its view that the provision’s legislative history made 
clear this congressional purpose for the statutory exception: “The 
meaning of the phrase ‘reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information’ . . . is clearer in the context of the role of the 
1984 Act in facilitating expedited approval of a generic version of a drug 
previously approved by the FDA.”162 
OSG disagreed. Its brief explained that such preclinical studies may 
indeed be “reasonably related to the development and submission” of 
drug approval information even outside the generic drug context.163 
They may, for example, inform the FDA’s decision whether even to 
allow clinical studies and thus move the pharmaceutical compound 
down the regulatory approval line.164 The agency may conclude, in light 
of such preclinical information, that a putative drug is simply too risky 
to be used in human studies.165 Hence, such uses of patented chemical 
                                                   
159. Merck, 545 U.S. at 203. 
160. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865–66 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
161. Id. at 866–67. But cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, 
Merck, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 429972 [hereinafter Merck Amicus Brief] (explaining 
that the Federal Circuit “issued an ‘errata’ sheet indicating that ‘the scope of the safe harbor is not limited 
to generic drug approval,’” but nevertheless issued a “revised opinion [that] continues to suggest that the 
statutory exemption should be construed to focus primarily on generic drugs”). 
162. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 866; see also id. at 865 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 857, 
at 8 (1984)). 
163. See Merck Amicus Brief, supra note 161, at 12. 
164. Merck, 545 U.S. at 204. 
165. Id. 
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compounds may be “reasonably related” to the development of 
information necessary to the FDA’s drug approval processes. 
The Court adopted the Government’s view: Its opinion explains that 
the section 271 exemption includes “the use of patented compounds in 
preclinical studies” “as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing 
that the experiments” may lead to the development of a new drug.166 
This, of course, was not the only possible outcome: The Supreme Court 
might have easily adopted the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statute, concluding (as the Court of Appeals did) that the statute’s text 
should be understood narrowly in view of the enactment’s apparent 
“nature and purpose.”167 Instead, the Court—expressly “giving 
appropriate recognition to the source for its holding”—adopted the more 
expansive interpretation of “reasonably related” advanced by the 
Solicitor  General.168 
Merck is especially notable for two reasons. 
First, Merck is notable for the statutory term—reasonableness—that 
the Court was tasked with interpreting. The word “reasonable” is a 
paradigmatic example of an ambiguous statutory term, one to which an 
agency might typically give further content through, say, rulemaking.169 
Where an agency, acting within its authority, properly promulgates a 
reasonable rule outlining the bounds of “reasonable” conduct, courts will 
defer.170 In Merck, OSG (together with the Patent Office and the 
Department of Health and Human Services, both also on the brief) 
advanced an interpretation of reasonableness that, in its view, best suited 
the purposes of the patent statute and the needs of the regulatory drug 
approval process: As in Microsoft, the Executive Branch’s position was 
expressly informed by “policy concerns animating the [statutory] 
exception.”171 Indeed, portions of the Solicitor General’s brief read like 
an expert agency order: Part B of the brief outlines the stages of drug 
development, from “basic research” to selecting compounds for 
“inclusion in the final version of a drug,” explaining that while “basic 
research” is “too attenuated” from the regulatory process, any further 
                                                   
166. Id. at 208; see also id. at 206 (“[T]he development of a new drug . . . is a process of trial and 
error . . . . [N]either the drugmaker nor its scientists have any way of knowing whether an initially 
promising candidate will prove successful over a battery of experiments. That is the reason they 
conduct the experiments.”). 
167. Cf. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2135, 2142 (2016). 
168. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018); Duffy, supra note 12, at 542. 
169. See, e.g., All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting 
“inherent ambiguity in words such as ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’”); Capital Network Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
170. See, e.g., All. for Cmty. Media, 529 F.3d at 778; Capital Network Sys., 28 F.3d at 204. 
171. Merck Amicus Brief, supra note 161, at 12. 
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“attempt to develop a particular drug” would be “reasonably related” to 
an application for agency approval.172 OSG thus described the technical 
process of pharmaceutical innovation and, in light of that description, 
developed a policy-informed standard for the sort of conduct that is 
“reasonably related” to FDA’s drug approval processes. And the Court, 
faced with both that phrase’s inherent ambiguity and the competing 
readings offered by the parties and amici, seems to defer to 
OSG’s  interpretation. 
But, second, as noted, deference may be appropriate only where an 
agency’s rule falls within the scope of the agency’s authority (here, over 
“proceedings in the [Patent] Office.”)173 So Merck is also notable 
because, as noted above, deference on matters of infringement seems 
unlikely under traditional conceptions of Step Zero.174 Perhaps, failing 
Step Zero, the Court’s implicit deference here is more akin to that 
arising out of Skidmore. But the agency’s litigation-based 
pronouncements here lack the procedural “thoroughness” that typically 
attends to Skidmore deference.175 As in KSR, no agency—neither the 
Patent Office nor HHS—was required to subject this interpretation to 
public review and comment. Hence, as I explain in greater detail in 
Part III, deference under this entire range of conditions—conflict 
between OSG and an underlying policy determination; litigation-specific 
rationales for agency rules; and revisions to agency practices that are 
untested by administrative process—seems suspect. 
4. Deference Exceptions? 
Myriad, Cuozzo, KSR, Microsoft, and Merck, among other cases, all 
suggest that the Supreme Court implicitly defers to the Executive Branch 
in a wide range of patent cases. Moreover, these cases provide examples 
of deference in cases presenting unusual intra-Executive postures: where 
the Patent Office and OSG disagree over the correct policy outcome; 
where OSG has substituted a litigation-specific rationale for the Patent 
Office’s original reasoning; where the Patent Office seeks to modify 
policy by circumventing notice-and-comment procedures; and where the 
Patent Office seeks to affect policy concerns that seem outside its scope. 
In short, OSG wields significant influence over patent policy matters. 
                                                   
172. Id. at 16–19. 
173. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
174. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
175. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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I am careful not to overstate my claim. The Supreme Court does not, 
to be sure, always follow the Solicitor General’s advice.176 But some of 
these cases echo a regular pattern of deference. After all, as noted above, 
deference to the Executive Branch may be warranted only where 
Congress has not already “directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”177 And where the Court and the Solicitor General’s Office have 
differed, that disagreement has, in several cases, centered on the nature 
and clarity of Congress’s directives. 
In SAS Institute, for example, the petitioner challenged another aspect 
of the Patent Office’s inter partes review proceedings, namely, the 
agency’s practice of “partial[ly] institut[ing]” review.178 This is akin to 
the Court’s own practice of limiting its certiorari grants to selected 
questions:179 If a petitioner challenges a patent’s first ten claims, the 
agency might agree to review only the first five. SAS Institute, whose 
petition for inter partes review had been only partially instituted, 
challenged this practice, contending that the agency had contravened the 
statute authorizing the agency to “issue a final written decision with 
respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the 
petitioner.”180 In its view, the statute’s reference to “any . . . claim” 
meant, in fact, every claim.181 OSG’s response suggested that the statute 
was ambiguous. In its view, “any” need not mean “every.”182 And OSG 
highlighted several policy considerations—including, for example, 
administrability concerns—that counseled in favor of giving the Patent 
Office the flexibility and discretion to review only the “most promising 
challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others.”183 
The Court sided with SAS Institute. The Court explained that, “after 
applying traditional tools of interpretation,” it could only conclude that 
the “statut[e] deliver[s] unmistakable commands” to review every 
challenge.184 Chevron deference therefore did not apply.185 Stated 
simply, the Court’s unwillingness to defer to the Solicitor General was 
grounded in the view that Congress had already “directly spoken” to the 
                                                   
176. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 88–89 (2012). 
177. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
178. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (2018). 
179. See, e.g., Dex Media v. Click-to-Call, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2742 (2019) (mem.) (granting 
certiorari, but only as to “Question 1 presented by the petition”). 
180. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1354. 
181. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)  (emphasis added); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1354. 
182. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1355–57. 
183. Id. (citing Brief for Federal Respondent at 35–36, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 628 (No. 16-969). 
184. Id. at 1358. 
185. Id. 
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matter, and the Patent Office thus lacked the discretion to vary its 
practice from Congress’s commands.186 
Consider, also, the Court’s decision in Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals.187 Inventors may not obtain a patent for a product that 
has already been put “on sale,” as patent law has long treated such sales 
as part of the relevant prior art.188 But the America Invents Act amended 
the relevant statutory provision to note that the relevant prior art includes 
inventions that have been placed “on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public.”189 Helsinn Healthcare asked the Court to decide whether this 
new language modified the longstanding rule that the “on-sale bar” 
included secret sales—sales that were not publicly disclosed and subject 
to non-disclosure agreements.190 Helsinn contended that the new 
language clarified that only public sales counted.191 And the Solicitor 
General agreed, citing, among other arguments, policy rationales in 
favor of limiting the on-sale bar.192 OSG, for example, explained that 
excluding secret sales would help small innovators: If the on-sale bar 
were still to apply to secret sales, then small companies would face 
continued difficulties in preparing to launch their innovations (by, say, 
being unable to share them with manufacturers and distributors without 
triggering the prohibition), while large, vertically-integrated companies 
faced no similar  constraints.193 
But the Court was unmoved. In its opinion, the Court explained that it 
had long held that an invention was “on sale” “when it was ‘the subject 
of a commercial offer for sale’ and ‘ready for patenting’” without regard 
to whether that sale “ma[de] the details of the invention available to the 
public.”194 The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that “if ‘on 
sale’ had a settled meaning before the [America Invents Act] was 
adopted, then adding the phrase ‘or otherwise available to the public’ to 
the statute ‘would be a fairly oblique way of attempting to overturn’ that 
‘settled body of law.’”195 The Court thus concluded that Congress 
                                                   
186. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); SAS Inst., 
138 S. Ct. at 1358. 
187. 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
188. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
189. Helsinn Healthcare, 139 S. Ct. at 631–32 (emphasis modified) (describing the pre- and post-
amendment statutes). 
190. Id. at 632. 
191. See id. at 634. 
192. E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21–26, Helsinn 
Healthcare, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 628 (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 4179034. 
193. Id. at 28. 
194. Helsinn Healthcare, 139 S. Ct. at 630 (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998)). 
195. Id. at 631–32 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Helsinn Healthcare, 139 S. Ct. 
628 (No. 17-1229) (statement of Malcolm Stewart, Deputy Solicitor Gen., Dep’t of Justice)). 
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reenacted the on-sale bar against a backdrop of settled law without 
changing its meaning. Since Congress had clearly spoken to the scope of 
the on-sale bar, the Executive Branch was obliged to apply that settled 
standard to its review of patent applications. 
* * * 
In all, the Solicitor General exerts an unmistakably important 
influence on the Court’s deliberations across a wide range of patent 
cases. Lauren Baer and William Eskridge have termed this sort of quiet 
influence “consultative deference,” a regime in which the Executive 
Branch’s inputs “shape [the Court’s] reasoning and influence its 
decision,” but without “explicitly stating that it is deferring to the 
agency.”196 Myriad, KSR, and Cuozzo reflect the power of the Solicitor 
General’s briefs in particular—sometimes even as opposed to the Patent 
Office’s preferred policies, established practices, or stated rationales. 
Similarly, Merck and Microsoft help to clarify how those briefs 
influence outcomes outside the Patent Office’s apparent scope of 
influence. In these close cases of statutory interpretation, OSG’s 
arguments and policy guidance can be dispositive. And in this respect, 
the Court’s informal regime of consultative deference to the Solicitor 
General mirrors—in effect—its more formal deference regimes. 
But a closer look reveals some important differences between the 
Court’s formal deference regimes and the special solicitude that OSG 
enjoys in these patent cases. The Court’s willingness to defer to OSG in 
cases of intra-Executive conflict, or in cases where OSG’s explanation 
for an agency practice is mismatched to the Patent Office’s rationale, is 
odd. Hence, the Supreme Court’s implicit deference to the Solicitor 
General—a practice that shifts the locus of Executive Branch patent 
policymaking to OSG—merits further scrutiny. 
II. DEFECTIVE DEFERENCE 
The practical consequence of the Court’s apparent deference to the 
Solicitor General is a shift in policymaking power away from the 
Judicial Branch and to the Executive Branch. And inside the Executive 
Branch, this practice shifts policymaking power to the Solicitor 
General’s Office. But this apparent description of (at least some of) the 
Supreme Court’s patent cases gives rise to a more fundamental question: 
Should the courts defer to the Executive Branch’s representative in such 
cases? 
The answer to this question requires examining the foundations for 
deference more generally: Should the courts defer to the Executive 
                                                   
196. Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1111–13. 
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Branch at all? When? In Chevron, the Supreme Court offered three 
rationales in favor of its rule of mandatory deference: expertise, 
accountability, and delegation. I consider whether these rationales 
(among others) apply to interpretations of patent law developed by the 
Solicitor General’s Office, almost always during the pendency of 
Supreme Court litigation, often then for the first time, and sometimes in 
conflict with the Patent Office’s own practices. They do not. 
A. Defects Under Deference Theories 
The Supreme Court’s implicit deference to the Solicitor General’s 
Office on matters of patent policy is inconsistent with the usual 
theoretical rationales favoring deference. 
As I noted above, the Court’s decision in Chevron offers three 
rationales for its regime of mandatory deference.197 First, agencies are 
relatively more expert than the courts.198 Second, agency officials may 
be held politically accountable for their policy decisions.199 Third, 
statutory ambiguity may reflect congressional intent to delegate 
interpretative authority to an agency.200 Likewise, the Court’s decisions 
in Mead and Skidmore may suggest that agency exercises of policy 
discretion via regular administrative procedures are more likely to 
receive mandatory deference—and even when agencies don’t clear the 
bar for such deference under Chevron, an agency’s views may 
nevertheless carry the day in view of its thorough investigations and 
accumulated experience. 
In all, scholars have sorted the Court’s varied pronouncements in 
three decades of cases (from 1984’s Chevron to 2013’s City of 
Arlington, and beyond) into several doctrinally-grounded theories of 
deference.201 Among the most prominent are implied delegation, agency 
expertise, reasoned deliberation, political accountability, and policy 
flexibility.202 
                                                   
197. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
198. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
199. Id. at 865–66. 
200. Id. at 865; see Gluck & Bressman, supra note 52, at 995–98. But see, e.g., Manning, supra 
note 52, at 458 (suggesting that such implied congressional delegation to agencies is a legal fiction). 
201. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
202. See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s 
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–81 (2018); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s 
Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–91 (2008) (describing the “host of theories [that] have 
sprung up . . . to justify Chevron’s revolution”). In addition to the considerations set out above, 
there is at least one more basis for deference that merits a quick word: national uniformity. See, e.g., 
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095, 1112 
(1987). I set this consideration aside here. This is because uniformity concerns do not bear on the 
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I do not mean to suggest that any one (or all) of these rationales 
definitively explain or justify Chevron or Skidmore: It is enough for my 
purposes here to take the position of a deference pluralist. Nor do I mean 
to suggest that all the Supreme Court’s patent cases are decided under 
either Skidmore’s or Chevron’s framework expressly.203 Rather, I simply 
mean to suggest that these deference doctrines seem to sit atop this 
cluster of ideas about comparative institutional competence and related 
legal values—but these ideas do not apply to the policy views developed 
by the Solicitor General for the purposes of patent litigation at the 
Supreme Court. Courts defer to agencies because Congress so 
empowered them and separation of powers principles thus counsel in 
favor of such deference;204 because they are more expert; because they 
may be held to account for their decision;205 because administrative 
process serves public participation values;206 and because agency 
rulemaking is comparatively flexible and can thus respond to changing 
conditions.207 Each of these theories plausibly explains deference in the 
general case. But no matter which of these theories of deference you 
choose, they have little purchase as applied to the policy views 
developed by OSG in patent litigation.208 
Even skeptics of de facto deference—those who might think that 
OSG’s successes are more fairly attributable to its advocacy skill than to 
some form of implicit deference—should be concerned about the policy 
                                                   
choice between executive agents: No matter whether patent policy is set by the Patent Office or the 
Solicitor General’s Office, either one helps to establish uniform, national rules. Moreover, the 
existence of the Federal Circuit—a single appellate court with nationwide jurisdiction over patent 
appeals—limits the power of the uniformity theory for deference in patent contexts. See Narechania, 
supra note 37, at 1363–64 (describing the Federal Circuit’s effect on uniformity concerns). 
203. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 153–154 (clarifying that the Supreme Court does 
not typically invoke its formal deference doctrines in patent cases).  
204. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 761, 798 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, 
Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 824 (2002) (suggesting that the 
delegation theory “has resuscitated the axiom that Congress is the primary source of authority to 
make law within our system of separation of powers”). 
205. E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
206. E.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 49, at 884–86; Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: 
Conceptualizing Skidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 
1122–23 (2001). 
207. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
208. Cf. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the Statutory President, WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (similar, but for the President instead of OSG). 
13 Narechania.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:49 PM 
2020] DEFECTIVE PATENT DEFERENCE 905 
 
views advanced by OSG in patent litigation.209 This is because of the 
nature of OSG’s representation: When the Solicitor General stands 
before the Supreme Court, he does so on behalf of the United States of 
America (and the Executive Branch in particular), accountable to the 
public and “commit[ted] to broader goals of justice and efficiency.”210 
Hence, even to the extent the Solicitor General’s views are merely 
persuasive to the Supreme Court (rather than the object of the Court’s 
deference), we might still examine how the Solicitor General develops 
its (ultra-persuasive) arguments on behalf of the public. This is because 
these foundations of deference—substantive expertise, reasoned 
decisionmaking, among others—offer one set of standards against which 
to measure the Executive Branch’s exercise of policymaking power.211 
In short, OSG’s comparative disadvantages (as compared to the Patent 
Office) along these dimensions should have important implications for 
the scope of the Solicitor General’s policy influence, no matter whether 
that influence arises from formal deference, informal deference, or mere 
persuasion. 
1. Implied Delegation  
I begin with the theory of implied delegation. Under Chevron, judicial 
deference is appropriate in part because statutory ambiguity reflects 
Congress’s intent to leave the matter to the agency. Sometimes 
“Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill.”212 In other 
cases, Congress uses a vague term—say, “reasonable”—which the 
agency may further define. In either event, deference reflects, at least in 
part, separation of powers principles and the courts’ longstanding respect 
for Congress’s legislative choices, including its decisions over who—
agency, legislature, or court—should make particular policy 
judgments.213 
                                                   
209. But see BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES, supra note 20, at 89–91 
(finding that OSG’s relative success cannot be explained by the experience of its attorneys, the 
quality of its attorneys, its resource advantages, or its selectivity in case selection); Black & Owens, 
A Built-In Advantage, supra note 20, at 457–61 (similar). 
210. Black & Owens, A Built-In Advantage, supra note 20, at 91; see also Vladeck, supra note 
20, at 123–24. 
211. Cf. Grumet, supra note 20, at 1860 (contending, analogously, that state attorneys general 
owe “accountability” and internal “separation of powers” duties to their home governments and 
constituencies in their Supreme Court advocacy). 
212. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also 
Lemos, supra note 19, at 206 n.69 (explaining that delegation is important under Skidmore too). 
213. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Bressman, supra note 204, at 798; Merrill, supra note 204, at 824 
(suggesting that delegation theory “has resuscitated the axiom that Congress is the primary source 
of authority to make law within our system of separation of powers”). 
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To be sure, scholars (among others) have criticized this implied 
delegation theory of deference.214 Primary among these critiques is the 
view that the theory “‘is fictional or fraudulent’—fictional because 
ambiguity does not necessarily evince congressional intent, and 
fraudulent because the Supreme Court seems disinterested in actually 
assessing congressional intent.”215 This critique has mixed empirical 
support: In their study on congressional drafting, Lisa Schultz Bressman 
and Abbe Gluck find that “ambiguity sometimes signals intent to 
delegate” but “often it does not.”216 Rather, statutory ambiguity may 
instead be a function of other considerations, including the need for 
consensus among a legislative majority.217 
These critiques, then, offer one reason to question the Court’s 
apparent deference to OSG’s views in patent cases. If the entire 
enterprise of judicial deference is based on delegation, and if delegation 
itself is a fraudulent fiction, there is no reason to defer to any executive 
agent. 
There are, however, reasons to think that implied delegation theory is 
not a fraudulent fiction—at least not entirely.218 As noted above, Lisa 
Bressman and Abbe Gluck’s study suggests that “ambiguity sometimes 
signals intent to delegate.”219 Indeed, some of their respondents say 
expressly that statutory ambiguity is “about punting to the agency,” 
“know[ing] the agency can fill the gaps.”220 That is, at least some 
statutory ambiguities may reflect a congressional desire to delegate the 
finer points of policy to an executive agency (perhaps in order to secure 
a legislative  majority). 
But which agency? Even if there is some (perhaps weak) support for 
implied delegation theory generally, there is no reason to think that 
Congress has delegated—impliedly or expressly—patent policymaking 
authority to the Solicitor General’s Office. The Patent Office—not 
                                                   
214. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing delegation). 
215. Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 202, at 1476; see also Manning, supra note 52, at 458 
(“Every framework used by the Court for determining the availability of deference has rested on a 
legal fiction about presumed legislative intent.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 995 (1992). 
216. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 52, at 996. 
217. Id. 
218. And, as I discuss in subsequent sections, there are reasons to think that the enterprise of 
deference is based on more than only delegation-related theories. 
219. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 52, at 996. 
220. Id. at 997; see also id. at 999 (explaining that Congress may intend to delegate policymaking 
authority where it confers rulemaking power under the Administrative Procedure Act); Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (reasoning that deference is 
warranted where “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill”). 
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OSG—is Congress’s delegee on questions of patent policy. This 
selection matters: Congress exercises legislative oversight and control by 
choosing from among different possible executive agents.221 
Congress has given the Patent Office the clear power to “establish 
regulations,” using standard administrative procedures, that “govern the 
conduct of proceedings in the Office,” including patent application 
review.222 The Supreme Court, moreover, has explained that this power 
extends to substantive policy determinations (even if the Patent Office 
has not yet invoked it).223 Hence, to the extent that deference is grounded 
in congressional delegations of policymaking power, these provisions of 
the Patent Act might be read as evidence of Congress’s intent to give the 
Patent Office, rather than any other office in the Executive Branch, some 
decisional authority.224 
There are, by contrast, no analogous directives from Congress to 
OSG. Indeed, the only statutory provision regarding the Solicitor 
General simply provides that “[t]he President shall appoint . . . a 
Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in 
the performance of his duties.”225 That bare qualification—to be 
“learned in the law”—reflects the Solicitor General’s responsibility to 
represent the Government in litigation, but offers practically no support 
for a policymaking role, let alone a patent one.226 
Viewed against this backdrop, Myriad’s story seems striking. Two 
executive agencies offered two distinct views on patentability: The 
Solicitor General’s Office argued that isolated DNA was not patentable, 
while the Patent Office remained committed to its practice of granting 
such patent applications. And though the Patent Office has a much 
stronger case to legislative delegation than OSG, the Court followed the 
                                                   
221. Cf. Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020); Sharon Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378, 378 
(2019). 
222. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C) (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 
2131, 2144 (2016). 
223. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143. 
224. The Federal Circuit, of course, disagrees. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But, as 
noted above, the Supreme Court might be understood to have taken a different view. See Cuozzo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2143 (questioning Cooper Techs., 536 F.3d 1330); see also id. (construing a similarly worded statute 
as granting the Patent Office the authority to issue regulations concerning the substantive standard for 
claim construction in inter partes review). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018) (“The Office may 
establish regulations . . . [that] shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.”), with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 316(a)(4) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations . . . governing inter partes review . . . .”). 
225. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2018). 
226. See Lemos, supra note 19, at 207–08 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 505) (reasoning that OSG, like 
the courts, should defer to agencies when defending Government action, because “Congress chose 
to delegate to the agency, not to the SG”). 
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Solicitor General’s advice—even as the Court has elsewhere suggested 
that no deference is due where one agency purports to interpret the 
statutory provisions administered by another agency.227 Indeed, the 
Court even suggested that OSG’s contrary position had “undercut” the 
Patent Office’s persuasive power. Instead, perhaps, it is the Patent 
Office’s decision to dissent from the Solicitor General’s brief that, under 
delegation theory, should have undermined OSG’s influence. I should be 
clear that my objection to the Court’s decision in Myriad is not 
substantive. I am (for present purposes) agnostic as to the right 
substantive standard for patent eligibility.228 But if that standard is to 
come from an executive agency, Congress likely would have preferred 
that the Patent Office, more than any other executive agency, make this 
policy decision. 
This is so even accounting for the underlying interagency conflict that 
led to the Solicitor General’s “reevaluation” of the Patent Office’s 
position:229 To the extent that the National Institutes of Health and the 
Patent Office disagreed over the patentability of certain genomic 
matter,230 it is far from clear that Congress gave OSG the authority to the 
mediate such interagency patent disputes. First, Congress has expressly 
directed the Patent Office to “advise” other “agencies and departments 
on matters of intellectual property policy.”231 So if the National Institutes 
of Health have questions about gene patents, the Patent Office seems 
assigned, by Congress, to provide the answers. And second, even if a 
persistent interagency conflict about patent policy arises, the 
responsibility to adjudicate such an intra-Executive conflict has often 
fallen to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, or to the 
White House itself, rather than to OSG.232 Though it is true that OSG has 
sometimes been thrust into the position of mediating interagency 
                                                   
227. See Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2019) (“[O]n no account might 
we agree that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a 
second statute it does not administer.”). 
228. Indeed, I find Myriad persuasive. I explain this view—and how it is consistent with my 
views on decisionmaking procedure—infra note 378. 
229. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 
2010-1406). 
230. See Park, supra note 23, at 526; see also Narechania, supra note 10, at 1504–06; Rai, supra 
note 7, at 1261. 
231. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(8)–(9) (2018). 
232. 28 U.S.C. § 511 (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2019); Exec. Order No. 12,146, 44 Fed. Reg. 
42657 (July 20, 1979); see Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2000); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1688, 1732 (2011); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010). 
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disputes,233 there is little reason to think that Congress expected the 
Executive Branch to deviate from its otherwise well-established 
practices for the patent conflict class alone.234 
The Executive Branch’s influence in Merck and Microsoft also seems 
inconsistent with the scope of the congressional delegation described 
above. Unlike the conflict at issue in Myriad, the Patent Office and OSG 
in fact agreed on the standard for reasonableness in Merck. But Merck, 
recall, was an infringement case.235 And such infringement matters 
would seem to be outside the scope of “proceedings in the Office.”236 
Indeed, though the Patent Office passes upon hundreds of thousands of 
patent applications each year, the questions at issue in cases like Merck 
and Microsoft do not arise until well after it issues a patent. In Merck, for 
example, the question of “reasonabl[y]” excused infringement did not 
arise until years after the patent in question issued.237 That is, while the 
Patent Office’s standard for patentability should govern the review of 
patent applications (and, hence, the scope of valid patents), it has no 
claim to authoritatively interpret infringement-related provisions.238 
In short, across many cases, the Supreme Court’s apparent deference 
to the views of the Solicitor General’s Office cannot be explained by any 
explicit (or implicit) delegation of policymaking authority from 
Congress. Congress has delegated no patent policymaking power to 
OSG, and so OSG has no obvious power to override the Patent Office’s 
policy determinations, or to step into a policy void left open by that 
agency’s inaction. Even when OSG relays the Patent Office’s views in 
infringement cases, a close look at Congress’s delegation would seem to 
put infringement-related matters outside the Executive Branch’s scope. 
2. Agency Expertise  
The Solicitor General’s Office also lacks the sorts of technical and 
legal patent expertise that may serve as the basis for deference. Chevron 
explains that an agency’s reasonable views are entitled to “considerable 
weight” where “a full understanding” of the “statutory policy” requires 
                                                   
233. See Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 370–71 (2013). 
234. Indeed, in other conflicts between intellectual property and other regulatory regimes, White 
House offices have helped mediate. See Narechania, supra note 10, at 1526, 1540. 
235. See supra notes 156–158, 174–176 and accompanying text. 
236. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). 
237. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 197–99 (2005). 
238. Moreover, as I described above, supra text accompanying note 175, OSG’s pronouncements in 
these cases might also seem to fail Skidmore’s requirement that an agency’s view evince some procedural 
“thoroughness . . . in its consideration.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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“more than ordinary knowledge” about the regulatory subject.239 
Skidmore likewise explains that courts may resort to an agency’s views 
for guidance in light of that agency’s “experience and informed 
judgment.”240 Together, Chevron and Skidmore both suggest that at least 
two dimensions of expertise are salient to the question of deference: 
first, agencies often have relevant technical knowledge about the 
industry or technology at issue; and second, agencies have relevant legal 
insight into, say, the purposes of Congress’s enactments, or the meaning 
of a statute’s terms and structure. But the Solicitor General’s Office, at 
least in respect to the Supreme Court’s patent docket, cannot stake a 
claim to either form of expertise. 
Consider technical expertise first. Courts defer to executive agencies 
because their deep, specialized knowledge about, say, the process of 
drug development enables them to more readily discern what limits on 
that process might be “reasonable.”241 That is, deference doctrines 
attempt to assign responsibility over substantive rules to a more 
institutionally competent actor—executive agencies. Agencies may, for 
example, employ specialist staff who can draw on their accumulated 
knowledge of the relevant technology or industry.242 Agencies may also 
gather information critical to rulemaking by, for example, holding public 
hearings, conducting original studies, and conferring with 
industry  experts.243 
But none of these features apply to OSG. Maggie Lemos, for 
example, has explained that “true specialization is rare” in the Solicitor 
General’s Office.244 Indeed, this lack of specialization is sometimes 
described as one of OSG’s assets: As it defends the Government’s 
portfolio of actions before the Judiciary, OSG takes a “broa[d] view” of 
litigation, one that is unencumbered by the “unproductive tunnel vision” 
that might characterize a single’s agency defense of its parochial 
                                                   
239. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (citing, inter 
alia, Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)). 
240. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
241. See Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 202, at 1477 (explaining that courts defer, “at least 
in part because those agencies are more expert than the courts in the subject matter”); see also supra 
notes 169–170 and accompanying text (discussing “reasonable” exceptions to patent infringement 
rules for drug development in Merck). 
242. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; see also Deborah Pearlstein, Justice Stevens and the 
Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1305–06 (2011). 
243. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2009 (explaining that the Patent Office “enjoys 
superior mechanisms of gathering information necessary to make informed patent policy decisions” 
because it “conducts hearings,” “partakes in research studies,” and “engages in rulemaking,” among 
other activities). 
244. Lemos, supra note 19, at 211–12. 
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interests at the expense of the Executive’s more long-term view.245 There 
are, thus, at least two significant benefits to OSG’s intervention as a 
generalist. First, the Solicitor General’s control over litigation may offer 
the President one means by which to execute on a long-term policy 
vision by helping to coordinate activity across the administrative state.246 
Second, the Solicitor General can play a valuable interpretative role, 
translating the agency’s technical work in more lucid terms.247 But those 
benefits do not hinge upon the Office’s expertise: Indeed, they may gain 
from that Office’s lack of substantive knowledge. Hence, though there 
are advantages to having the Solicitor General serve in this unique role 
of interbranch translator, those advantages do not accord with the 
doctrines of judicial deference. 
The same can be said for the second form of expertise, legal expertise. 
Chevron itself, for example, is understood to maintain that where an 
agency is responsible for “administer[ing]” some “statutory schema,” 
that agency usually has “far greater expertise than courts as to the 
legislative processes that resulted in th[at] statutory schema.”248 This 
may be for several reasons. One, the agency’s repeat interactions with 
the statute can give rise to greater familiarity with the various details of 
Congress’s (sometimes lengthy and interlocking) statutory schemes. 
Two, some scholars have described the agencies’ own direct 
participation in the legislative process, explaining that such participation 
justifies deference.249 Indeed, both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia 
agreed that the agencies’ involvement in legislative process enable them 
to better implement a statute’s purpose.250 And three, some agency 
personnel may have experience that similarly provides unique insight 
into a statute’s nature and purpose. 
None of these attributes appear to apply to the Solicitor General’s 
Office. Instead, they better describe the Patent Office. 
First, while the volume of patent cases on the Supreme Court’s docket 
is, on average, higher than before, the number and nature of these cases 
seem hardly likely to turn OSG into a Patent Act expert. In some Terms, 
patent cases may occupy a sizable portion of the Supreme Court’s total 
                                                   
245. Id. at 211. 
246. See Picozzi, supra note 35, at 445–46. This is only true to the extent that the President 
exercises some control over the Solicitor General. But there may be some reasons to question the 
extent of the President’s control. See infra notes 310–314 and accompanying text. 
247. Lemos, supra note 19, at 211. 
248. Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 202, at 1477. 
249. E.g., Shobe, supra note 32, at 286. 
250. See Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 202, at 1477 (first citing Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521; then citing Stephen 
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986)). 
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docket.251 But even when patent cases take up 10% of the Court’s 
argument time, that amounts to six cases in total.252 Moreover, several of 
these cases pertain to procedural or remedial questions that are outside 
the “core” of patent doctrine.253 By contrast, the Patent Office passes on 
over 300,000 patent applications each year, and it has conducted over 
1,000 post-issuance review proceedings.254 
Second, the Solicitor General seems unlikely to have had a hand in 
helping to draft aspects of the Patent Act. OSG’s absence from the 
legislative process suggests that it has no special insight into the 
meaning of Congress’s provisions. By contrast, Congress enacted a 
landmark 2011 patent reform statute, the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, “after many years of negotiation between the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office . . . and various congressional committees. The 
[Patent Office] prepared an early version of the legislation, then 
proceeded to send at least six views, letters, and various reports to 
congressional committees in the following years.”255 
And, finally, one of the principal drafters of the America Invents Act, 
Joe Matal, eventually served as the Patent Office’s Deputy General 
Counsel and Interim Director.256 But there is no obvious connection 
between OSG’s personnel and patent-related legislative activity. 
The Patent Office’s legal expertise has important implications for 
cases such as Cuozzo. As noted above, the Patent Office regulation at 
issue in Cuozzo directed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to apply the 
                                                   
251. See Narechania, supra note 37, at 1346 (“In its 2016 Term, the Supreme Court dedicated 
nearly ten percent of its docket to patent cases.”). 
252. Id. at 1346 n.1. 
253. Id. at 1349; Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 
16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 331 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s recent decisions, though 
substantial in number, have rarely involved the fundamental legal doctrines that directly ensure the 
inventiveness of patents and regulate their scope.”). 
254. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR 
YEARS (1963–2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S8LG-S63M]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, 
PGR, 
CBM (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_mar_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3LN-UFFV]. But see Narechania, supra note 10, at 1487 (questioning the 
sufficiency of the Patent Office’s expertise in instances of conflict between patent law decisions and 
other regulatory regimes). I continue to believe that, in cases arising out of the interstices of patent 
policy and other regulatory interests, the Patent Office may not possess the sort of expertise 
necessary to resolve the policy conflict. Indeed, as I suggest elsewhere, some formal mechanism 
may help resolve such intra-Executive conflicts. See Tejas N. Narechania, Structuring 
Intraexecutive Patent Conflict (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); cf. Return 
Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 587 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1853 (2019). But, in all events, the 
Patent Office is likely to possess more expertise that the Solicitor General’s Office.  
255. Shobe, supra note 32, at 302 n.72. 
256. See Joseph Matal, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/executive-biographies/joseph-matal [https://perma.cc/8BEB-N67N]. 
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“broadest reasonable construction” standard in inter partes review.257 
And the Patent Office’s rule implied that the America Invents Act 
required it to apply this standard; the Act’s provisions, structure, and 
legislative history all suggested, in that agency’s view, that this was the 
standard that Congress expected the Patent Office to employ. But the 
Solicitor General reframed the agency’s defense as primarily about 
legislative delegation: Congress, the SG argued, expressly gave the 
agency discretion to choose which standard to apply by authorizing it to 
issue regulations “governing inter partes review.”258 But under this 
theory of expertise, it is the Patent Office—not the Solicitor General’s 
Office—that is most likely to best approximate Congress’s intent. That 
is, the Patent Office is comparatively better suited to know whether 
Congress intended the agency to apply one particular standard or 
whether Congress intended to give the agency discretion to choose. The 
Solicitor General’s success in substituting its judgment for the agency’s 
has real consequences: By successfully defending the agency’s 
regulations on Chevron’s terms, the Solicitor General gave future Patent 
Office directors the flexibility to change course. And, indeed, the next 
administration issued a new rule, changing the governing standard from 
broadest reasonable interpretation to Phillips—the standard employed in 
the district courts.259 So though the present Patent Office may value that 
flexibility, the past Patent Office seemed to suggest—based on its 
legislative expertise regarding a statute it helped to draft—that Congress 
did not grant any such discretion. 
If deference turns on expertise, then OSG falls short. Though 
deference to the Executive Branch may be founded on the agencies’ 
comparative advantages in substantive and legal expertise, the Solicitor 
General’s Office possesses neither. Of course, a similar objection might 
be levied at the Supreme Court’s decision to defer to any Executive 
policy judgment: After all, the Solicitor General generally defends the 
Executive’s actions in all cases, not just patent ones. But there is a 
critical difference: In, say, a telecommunications case, the underlying 
action reflects the agency’s expertise. NTIA’s decisions, for example, 
are often based on its lengthy experience with telecommunications 
regulation, on advice from industry and experts, its own data analyses, 
and its own interactions with Congress, among other inputs. And the 
Solicitor General’s role is generally to defend that underlying action. But 
                                                   
257. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016). 
258. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2018). See generally Hemel & Nielson, supra note 49.  
259. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21221, 21221 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
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in patent cases, policymaking and policy defense seem to happen 
simultaneously. Moreover, as the next section describes, even where the 
Patent Office shares its expertise with the Solicitor General’s Office in 
litigation contexts, the Patent Office’s own input may not reflect the 
reasoned deliberation that typically informs the Judiciary’s deference to 
the Executive.260 
3. Reasoned Deliberation 
In Mead, the Supreme Court explained that “express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication” 
are a “very good indicator” that deference is warranted.261 Why do 
deference doctrines care about such deliberative process? Such process 
requirements are, in part, a proxy for the other foundations of deference. 
Authorization to use formal rulemaking authority might signal some 
legislative intent to delegate policymaking power.262 Likewise, requiring 
an agency to make policy through regular administrative processes helps 
to ensure that the agency’s regulations are informed by both its internal 
expertise, as well as its capacity to coordinate external expertise through 
comments and  hearings.263 
But there are distinct (though related) reasons that such reasoned 
deliberation forms an independent theoretical basis for deference. Stated 
simply, “[r]ulemaking is an excellent policymaking mechanism.”264 That 
is, “agencies are better at collecting and synthesizing information 
through rulemaking processes than are courts through litigation.”265 And 
requiring—and enforcing, through, say, the Chenery doctrine (which 
prevents agencies from justifying policy decisions through post hoc or 
litigation-specific rationales)—such administrative process helps to 
ensure that an agency has in fact “worked through” a regulatory 
problem.266 Finally, such process requirements increase opportunities for 
                                                   
260. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.: 
FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 48 (2005) (“The [Patent Office] also assisted the Solicitor General’s Office 
with the government’s brief in Merck . . . .”). 
261. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (highlighting the importance of the “thoroughness” of an agency’s investigation). 
262. Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 202, at 1478–79; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 52, at 999. 
263. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (Such “relatively formal administrative procedure[s] tend[] to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”). 
264. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
469, 486 (1986). 
265. Criddle, supra note 202, at 1291. 
266. See Stack, supra note 41, at 1005; see also Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 584 U.S. __, 136 
S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016). 
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public participation, and thereby enhance the democratic legitimacy of 
the agency’s action.267 
Hence, this basis for deference consists of at least three components. 
First, the agency must “collect[] and synthesize information” by, say, 
soliciting public comment and “facilitat[ing] public participation.”268 
Second, the agency must actually “work through” the problem.269 And 
third, to merit deference under Chevron, the agency’s position in 
litigation must actually reflect that deliberative process.270 
As compared to other executive agencies, the Solicitor General’s 
Office, acting as patent policymaker, falls short along each of these 
three  requirements. 
First, OSG’s decisionmaking processes do not appear to closely track 
regular, formal rulemaking procedures. To be sure, Mead acknowledges 
that such formal administrative processes are not strictly required: 
Courts may defer under Skidmore “even when no such administrative 
formality was required and none was afforded.”271 And representatives 
of the Solicitor General’s Office have described aspects of its process in 
ways that sound in traditional administrative process. OSG, for example, 
does “seek input from all affected federal agencies,” and it “will meet 
with a party to a case in which it’s going to file . . . [a]nd it will give an 
equal opportunity to lawyers for the other side if they ask.”272 That is, 
the Solicitor General’s Office will consult with other agencies that it 
believes will have a stake in the case’s outcome—and the Office will 
agree to meet with the parties to the litigation. 
But because the effects of the Supreme Court’s cases range far 
beyond the parties to the litigation, the Solicitor General’s views often 
                                                   
267. E.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 49, at 884–86; Rossi, supra note 206, at 1122–23. 
268. Criddle, supra note 202, at 1291, 1317. 
269. See Stack, supra note 41, at 1005; cf. Jeremy Rozansky, Note, Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1927, 1927 (2018) (“Congress wants agency policy change to be channeled through 
rigorous procedures. Such procedures—like notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal 
adjudication—help ensure that the agency actually wrestles with technical arguments, more fully 
deliberates, alerts Congress and interested individuals to a pending action, works with elected 
officials, and provides a basic opportunity for individual participation in the decisionmaking.”). 
270. E.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127 (citing, inter alia, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 
U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
271. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). 
272. Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here To Help”: Obtaining Amicus 
Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209, 
218 (2009); Ginger D. Anders, Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General: An Obscure But 
Important 
Part of Supreme Court Practice, A.B.A.: TRENDS (June 26, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/gr
oups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2016-2017/july-august-2017/calls-for-the-
views-of-the-solicitor-general/ [https://perma.cc/UB8M-WXDW]. 
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implicate broad interests.273 Merck, for example, had implications for the 
entire pharmaceutical industry.274 Microsoft mattered for a wide range of 
computer hardware and software manufacturers.275 Yet OSG does not 
appear to solicit the views of representatives of such interests, nor do 
such representatives have many, if any, opportunities to participate in 
OSG’s process. That is, because “there are no formal avenues for the 
public to participate in SG decisionmaking,” interested groups have 
scant procedural protections.276 Hence, even if OSG runs a thorough, 
open, and inclusive decisionmaking process in one case, it is not 
required to do so in all cases. And, indeed, OSG’s practices can vary 
widely, from case-to-case and administration-to-administration.277 
And even for those sister agencies and parties that are invited to 
participate in OSG’s decisionmaking process, that Office’s process 
differs from usual rulemaking proceedings in notable respects. For 
example, an agency typically “has an obligation to make its views 
known to the public in a concrete and focused form so as to make 
criticism or formulation of alternatives possible.”278 And agencies must 
typically respond to all major objections raised in a proceeding.279 OSG, 
by contrast, obfuscates. “[C]ounsel [for interested parties] should not 
expect attorneys from [OSG] to discuss their anticipated position in the 
case.”280 And outside observers often do not know why the Solicitor 
General’s Office has reached one conclusion over another. 
To be sure, former Solicitors General have described such silence as a 
necessary byproduct of OSG’s decisionmaking process.281 But other 
agencies, of course, routinely adhere to this procedural requirement in 
                                                   
273. See SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (2019) (explaining that the Supreme Court may agree to hear cases 
that present an “important question of federal law”). 
274. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Applera Corp. & Isis Pharm., Inc. in Support of 
Respondents at 6, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 
2005 WL 682090 [hereinafter Applera & Isis Amicus Brief]. 
275. See, e.g., Brief of U.S. Philips Corp. & Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 5–6, Microsoft v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL 
197102 [hereinafter Philips Amicus Brief]. 
276. Lemos, supra note 19, at 221. 
277. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 20, 125, 132–34 (describing differences across presidential 
administrations); infra notes 359–360 and accompanying text (describing variance in OSG’s CVSG 
practice across patent cases). 
278. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Bazelon, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“I believe that advance notice and opportunity for public participation are vital if a semblance of 
democracy is to survive in this regulatory era.”). 
279. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
280. Millett, supra note 272, at 221–22. 
281. Id. (OSG will not disclose its policy preferences because meetings with interested parties are 
“part of the Solicitor General’s process of formulating its own position.”). 
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their own decisionmaking processes, in order to both help interested 
commenters focus their contributions and to avoid any unfair surprise in 
the agency’s final outcome. Not so at OSG. 
Likewise, former Solicitors General have described the Office’s 
process of soliciting input as a series of cross-examinations: Each 
interaction is like its own “moot court,” putting each party’s preferred 
position on trial.282 Such a series of discrete interrogations, mediated by 
the Solicitor General’s office, contrasts sharply with a typical 
rulemaking proceeding. Agency dockets can read much more like a 
conversation among commenters: Interested parties respond directly to 
one another (and the agency, too), disputing each others’ factual 
premises, identifying policy concerns, and proposing alternative 
regulations and outcomes. This latter, more robust model of “publi[c] 
participation in the administrative process can make the law better—
better informed, and better calibrated” to its possible effects, whereas 
OSG’s closed, private process remains susceptible to errors and 
omissions.283 
This secretive process also undermines the integrity of the Solicitor 
General’s influence over patent policy. This is so even where the SG and 
the Patent Office are in accord—when, that is, OSG might be said to be 
able to draw upon the primary agency’s expertise.284 Consider Merck, a 
case with important ramifications for the pharmaceutical industry. There, 
officials from both the Patent Office and the Department of Health and 
Human Services signed the Solicitor General’s brief, which argued in 
favor of a construction of “reasonable” that favored generic drug 
manufacturers over pharmaceutical innovators. And the Court deferred 
to that position. But neither the Patent Office nor Health and Human 
Services ever had to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding 
that proposed construction, nor was either forced to respond to the 
objections of pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, other amici in Merck 
contended that the Government’s proposed rule would undermine 
                                                   
282. See, e.g., Anders, supra note 272; Millett, supra note 272, at 221–22; Gene Quinn, Mechanics of a 
Supreme Court Decision to Grant Certiorari, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 29, 2012), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/11/29/mechanics-of-a-supreme-court-decision-to-grant-
certiorari/id=30526/ [https://perma.cc/7TPK-3H7M] (interviewing former Solicitor General Seth 
Waxman). 
283. Compare, e.g., Eugene Scalia, The Value of Public Participation in Rulemaking, REG. REV. 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/25/scalia-public-participation-rulemaking/ 
[https://perma.cc/PEB9-7XMR], with, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the 
Solicitor General, and the Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600 (2013), 
and Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1787–88 (2014). 
284. Long, supra note 71, at 1988 (explaining that the Patent Office is becoming a “more 
aggressive” “supplier of legal rules” but noting the transparency-related concerns that attend to this 
mode of rulemaking). 
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incentives for some basic research, would violate the Government’s 
treaty obligations, and would have adverse long-term effects on public 
health.285 The agencies were never made to respond to these arguments, 
and it is practically impossible to know whether they would have 
modified their position in response to comments such as these. Such 
deficits undermine the case for deference under either Chevron or 
Skidmore.286 Similarly, in Microsoft, the Solicitor General argued that its 
proposed rule would advance “the goal of a technology-neutral statutory 
scheme.”287 But Philips Electronics argues, in its own amicus brief, that 
the SG’s position “unfairly favors the software industry over traditional 
electronics hardware companies.”288 How did the Executive Branch 
address this apparent contradiction? We do not know. 
The Solicitor General’s procedures thus differ from the policymaking 
processes imposed on other agencies. Agencies must, under Chevron, 
typically disclose their proposed rules and open those proposals to 
comment and criticism from the public. OSG, by contrast, need not offer 
any hints as to its preliminary leanings, and it is free to solicit input from 
only a select group of interested agencies and parties (and to do so on its 
own terms). In short, the public has few, if any, procedural protections in 
the Solicitor General’s decisionmaking process—and thus enjoys only 
limited, if any, opportunities to contribute to the SG’s final decision.289 
These process deficiencies not only risk omitting critical information 
that might alter OSG’s proposed rules, their closed and secretive nature 
also harms these rules’ legitimacy.290 
Second, even with these limited inputs, OSG’s opportunity to work 
through the patent policy problem presented in a given case is sharply 
limited by the demands of the Supreme Court’s judicial process. 
Whenever the Solicitor General is thrust into the position of defending 
(or making) executive policy, litigation is necessarily the “triggering 
event” that compels the Government to “consider, determine, and 
potentially assert an interpretation of its obligations and authority.”291 
                                                   
285. See Brief of Amici Curiae Wis. Alumni Research Found. et al. in Support of Respondents at 
19–23, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237);id. at 23–
25; Applera & Isis Amicus Brief, supra note 274. 
286. United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944) (deference is based, in part, on the “thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] 
consideration”). 
287. Microsoft Amicus Brief, supra note 139, at 25. 
288. See, e.g., Philips Amicus Brief, supra note 275, at 1. 
289. Lemos, supra note 19, at 221. 
290. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive 
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1624–25 (1985); Rossi, supra note 206, at 1122–23. 
291. See Ingber, supra note 233, at 360.  
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But litigation is a comparatively poor “interpretive catalyst”: Litigation 
imposes, for example, serious time pressure and can thereby result in 
serious adverse policy consequences.292 
In those cases in which the Supreme Court has asked OSG to file a 
certiorari-stage amicus brief, OSG tends to hold itself to a few informal, 
self-imposed deadlines.293 This means that the Executive’s deliberative 
processes usually stretches for no more than a few months, with the 
timeline dictated (to some extent) by the Court. By contrast, the 
Government Accountability Office has found that major agency 
proceedings require an “average time . . . [of] about four years,” with a 
lower bound of about one year.294 That is, major agency actions seem to 
require at least twice the time that the Solicitor General’s Office 
typically allots to cases that have attracted the Supreme Court’s 
attention. Indeed, the Patent Office’s decision to change the claim 
construction standard applied in inter partes review took, from inception 
to promulgation, nearly one year: The Patent Office Director, Andrei 
Iancu, appears to have first floated the possibility in response to the 
Senate’s questions during his confirmation hearing, and the final rule 
issued over ten months later.295 To be sure, the Patent Office’s formal 
comment period did not occupy all ten months: Instead, the Office had 
the opportunity to solicit input, formulate an initial view, and craft its 
notice of proposed rulemaking, all before beginning its formal six-month 
rulemaking process.296 Agencies thus enjoy more time—and greater 
flexibility—when “working through” their policy problems.297 
                                                   
292. See id.; see also Dan Levine & Lawrence Hurley, Google Versus Oracle Case Exposes 
Differences Within Obama Administration, REUTERS (May 15, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/artic
le/us-google-oracle-lawsuit-insight-idUSKBN0O017Z20150515 [https://perma.cc/3H5Z-28E9]. 
293. See, e.g., Lisa McElroy, “CVSG”s in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10, 2010, 10:15 
AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/last-week-in-plain-english-2/ [https://perma.cc/BG7N-
E9HT] (explaining that OSG “has filed most invitation briefs at three times of the year: late May, so 
that the cases can be considered before the summer recess; around August, so that the cases can go 
on the summer list; and December, so that the cases can be considered in time to be argued that 
Term if the Court grants cert”). 
294. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB 
REGULATORY REVIEWS 5 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09205.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PP4-W9K2]. 
295. Compare, e.g., Nomination of Andrei Iancu to be the Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 115th 
Cong. 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Iancu%20Responses%20to%20QF
Rs.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT7A-X8GZ] (written response of Andrei Iancu) (suggesting that 
changing the claim construction standard may be one way to improve inter partes review), with 83 
Fed. Reg. 51340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (changing the claim construction standard). 
296. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21221, 21221 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
297. See Stack, supra note 41, at 1005. 
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These time- and flexibility-related advantages do not account for the 
other advantages, such as in human resources, that agencies have vis-à-
vis OSG: The Solicitor General’s Office has only a relatively “small 
staff” of lawyers.298 And the nature of Supreme Court litigation means 
that OSG faces other limits, too. For example, OSG must explain its 
views in less than 9,000 words.299 By contrast, the Patent Office used 
more than 21,000 words to explain and defend its recently promulgated 
rule switching the substantive claim construction standard in inter partes 
review.300 
Agencies enjoy deference in part because they must adhere to formal 
processes that invite public participation, and because they do, in fact, 
have substantial and lengthy interactions with the interested public. 
OSG, by contrast, need not submit to such procedural requirements. 
And, once called upon by the Supreme Court, OSG seems to feel 
obligated to offer its opinion in relatively short order. It is practically 
impossible to pinpoint any one case where these limits on OSG’s 
decisionmaking process has altered the outcome. But that reflects part of 
the problem: The Solicitor General’s litigation-based interventions lack 
the transparency that is a hallmark of much agency policymaking, 
making it difficult to discern how OSG has reached a decision, or why 
the Solicitor General advocates for one outcome over another. 
This is problematic in cases, such as KSR and Cuozzo, where the 
Solicitor General’s view in litigation differs from the Patent Office’s 
administrative practice. Cases such as Chenery and Bowen, for example, 
explain that “the object of [the Judiciary’s] deference is the result of 
agency decision-making, and not some post hoc rationale developed as 
part of a litigation strategy.”301 That is, “deference . . . is implicitly 
conditioned on the agency’s having worked through the problem, with 
reason-giving as the overt expression of its exercise of discretion 
and  expertise.”302 
Moreover, the Court’s implicit deference to the views advanced in 
OSG’s briefs gives the Patent Office an end-run around this requirement 
of regularity. In Cuozzo, for example, the agency’s regulation rested on 
its view that the America Invents Act required the agency to employ the 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard. There, it did not have to 
justify that standard as the better policy choice—only as the superior 
                                                   
298. Millett, supra note 272, at 211. 
299. SUP. CT. R. 33(g)(xi) (2019). 
300. See 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
301. Kan. City v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see Stack, 
supra note 41, at 1005–06. 
302. Stack, supra note 41, at 1005. 
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interpretative result.303 But OSG’s brief defended the rule as a 
reasonable policy choice—and, in doing so, did not have to respond to 
commenters that might argue that Phillips is the better policy choice 
given agency discretion. 
So too in KSR: In KSR, the agency continued to apply the TSM test in 
patent examination, even as it urged OSG to favor a different 
obviousness standard, on the grounds that such a standard would save 
the agency needless time and expense.304 The Executive Branch never 
had to receive—let alone respond to—policy objections to KSR’s more 
flexible obviousness standard (that, say, the tradeoff in agency time for 
accuracy is well worth it), and the Court deferred to the Executive 
Branch’s litigating positions, even though those arguments did not have 
to face the tests imposed by, say, the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
Patent Office, of course, need not engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking for every agency action (including, for example, 
interpretative rules).305 But to the extent that the nature of a court’s 
deference to an agency is informed by the nature of the agency’s 
process, KSR falls short.306 Instead, such concerns were raised only at 
the Court and between amici. But, as I describe in the following section, 
this shift in forum has other effects for other theories of deference. 
In all, the Court’s decisions to defer to the Solicitor General’s views 
fail to accord with this theory of deference—that deference is due where 
it is the product of an agency’s reasoned deliberation. This is due not 
only to OSG’s comparative procedural disadvantages, but also especially 
to the range of intra-Executive conflict that sometimes presents in these 
patent  cases. 
4. Political Accountability  
Courts may also defer to the Executive Branch’s policy 
determinations because agency officials may, unlike Article III judges, 
be held to account for the consequences of their decisions. Chevron itself 
                                                   
303. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,679, 
48,698 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). There, the Patent Office responded to 
comments favoring the Phillips standard by highlighting its view that the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” standard is required by the “statutory language,” “legislative history,” and “judicial 
precedent.” Id. 
304. See supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text. 
305. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95–97 
(2015). 
306. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (such “relatively formal 
administrative procedure[s] tend[] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force”). 
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describes this basis for deference: “[I]t is entirely appropriate for [the 
Executive Branch] of the Government to make such policy choices—
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of 
everyday realities.”307 
This accountability rationale has two dimensions. The first is internal: 
Because the President can exercise oversight—at the extreme, by way of 
removal—agencies will faithfully carry out the President’s policy 
vision.308 The second, which depends on the first, is external: Because 
agencies must reflect the President’s policy vision, the national public 
can hold—through, say, presidential election—the Executive responsible 
for its agencies’ actions (and the policies they implement).309 
But this accountability theory, when applied to OSG’s role in patent 
cases, suffers at least two defects. One, the Solicitor General’s Office is 
treated as relatively independent from the President, and thus may not 
reflect the President’s patent policy preferences. That is, there is—by 
design—less internal accountability between the President and the 
Solicitor General over OSG’s litigating positions. Moreover, because 
there is less internal accountability, external accountability—e.g., 
election—may be less effective. And two, even where OSG and the 
President agree, the Solicitor General must launder its preferences 
through the Supreme Court. This, however, deflects blame onto the 
Judiciary, and thereby complicates the voting public’s ability to hold a 
responsible party  accountable. 
First, the Solicitor General’s Office is relatively (if incompletely) 
independent of the President. In his seminal book on the Solicitor 
General, Lincoln Caplan explains that OSG “must be free to reach [its] 
own carefully reasoned conclusions about the proper answer to a 
question of law, without second-guessing or insistence that [its] legal 
advice regularly conform to the politics of the administration he 
represents.”310 That is, the Solicitor General cannot be made a 
                                                   
307. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
308. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) 
(“If deference follows, as Chevron stated, from the political leadership and accountability that the 
President offers, then deference should attach not to the whole but only to some subset of agency 
action. The task for post- Chevron courts, on this view, would involve developing doctrine that 
recognizes, and thereby promotes, actual rather than assumed presidential control over 
administrative action.”); see also Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 584 U.S. __, 
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
309. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is . . . .”). 
310. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 18. 
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“mouthpiece for the President.”311 Indeed, the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel has agreed that the Solicitor General should be 
“permitted to exercise independent and expert legal judgment essentially 
free from extensive involvement in policy matters.”312 And this view 
appears to in fact inform the Executive’s relationship with OSG: Jeffrey 
Wall, a Principal Deputy Solicitor General during the Trump 
Administration, has explained that consultation with the President is 
“very, very rare.”313 
Such independence may undermine the case for deference: “If the 
SG’s decisions cannot be traced in some meaningful way to the 
President,” then the Solicitor General’s vast influence over patent policy 
“seem[s] inconsistent with the notions of political accountability that run 
throughout administrative law.”314 In short, even if patent policy were a 
presidential or national priority, it is not at all clear that the Executive 
could influence the SG’s litigating positions—nor is it clear that the 
voting public could influence patent policy. Indeed, the opaque nature of 
OSG’s processes, described above, both limits the public’s participation 
in OSG policymaking, and obscures from the voting public any links 
between the Executive’s policy preferences and the Solicitor General’s 
advocacy. 
Second, though the Court appears, in many cases, to defer to the 
Solicitor General, it only occasionally expressly explains that it is 
deferring to the Executive Branch or otherwise cites the source of its 
policy reasoning. That is, though the Court’s opinions often mirror the 
Solicitor General’s briefs, the Court does not always formally invoke its 
deference doctrines. 
This unusual mode of deference—de facto rather than de jure, as I’ve 
explained above—has problematic implications for the accountability 
theory. The Court’s opinions incorporating the Solicitor General’s views 
into its own precedent do not consistently credit the Executive Branch 
with such reasoning. And the Court’s relative silence as to the source of 
the policy concerns in cases such as Microsoft or Myriad, among others, 
means the public may attribute those rationales—perhaps incorrectly—
to the Court, rather than the Executive. The public may thus hold the 
                                                   
311. Id. 
312. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, NO. 77-56, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL: ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 232 (Leon Ulman ed., 1977). 
313. Marie-Rose Sheinerman, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Discusses Upcoming Supreme 
Court 
Cases, PRINCETONIAN (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2019/04/jefferywa
lltalk?utm_source=email&utm_medium=enl&utm_campaign=supremecourtbrief&utm_content=20
190410&utm_term=nlj [https://perma.cc/9VTR-6CX8]. 
314. Lemos, supra note 19, at 218. 
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wrong Branch responsible, and so they do not hold the Executive 
accountable. 
This is evident in the commentary on the Court’s patent cases. There 
is no shortage of commentators decrying the Supreme Court’s various 
interventions on questions of patent validity—eligibility and 
obviousness—as misguided at best.315 But to the extent that the Court’s 
opinions are vessels for the Solicitor General’s arguments in cases like 
KSR or Myriad, such criticism may be better directed at executive 
officials rather than the Supreme Court.316 
5. Policy Flexibility  
Finally, deference doctrines may reflect values related to flexibility 
and policy experimentation.317 Chevron, for example, directs executive 
agencies to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of [their] 
polic[ies] on a continuing basis.”318 And Brand X goes even further, 
holding that agencies may not only revisit their own understandings of 
statutes, but may also upend judicial constructions of ambiguous 
statutes. Together, these decisions reflect a view that agencies must be 
able to avoid statutory and regulatory “ossification” by “revising 
unwise . . . constructions of ambiguous statutes” in order to respond to 
changing circumstances.319 
                                                   
315. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Did the Supreme Court Intentionally Destroy the U.S. Patent 
System?, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/22/did-the-
supreme-court-intentionally-destroy-the-u-s-patent-system/id=97514/ [https://perma.cc/6W7X-
RR7Y]. 
316. For KSR, see, for example, Gene Quinn, KSR—The 5th Anniversary: One Supremely 
Obvious Mess, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 29,2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ksr-the-
5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/id=24456/ [https://perma.cc/7ZSM-UYCF] (arguing 
“the Supreme Court undid [Congress’s] policy decision” by adopting a new obviousness test, and 
suggesting that the “Court is openly hostile to patents”). For Myriad, see, for example, Noam 
Prywes, 
The Supreme Court’s Sketchy Science, SLATE (June 14, 2013), https://slate.com/technology/2013/06
/supreme-court-patent-case-science-the-justices-misunderstand-molecular-biology.html 
[https://perma.cc/WT4D-H4MW] (criticizing the Court’s “haphazard understanding” of the 
biotechnology at issue in Myriad); Gene Quinn, Why SCOTUS Myriad Ruling Overrules 
Chakrabarty, IPWATCHDOG (July 14, 2013), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/14/why-scotus-
myriad-ruling-overrules-chakrabarty/id=43249/ [https://perma.cc/3AAW-5KEW] (“Myriad is . . . a 
disaster.”). 
317. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 202, at 1279–83 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: 
The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2587–88, 2595 (2006). 
318. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984). 
319. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42 (1983). 
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But the Court’s unusual mode of deference to the Solicitor General 
undermines these values. As noted above, the Court’s deference is 
informal rather than formal. The Court thus enshrines its interpretations 
in precedent and thereby limits the Executive’s power to shape patent 
policy on an ongoing basis. 
Cuozzo is the exception that helps illustrate the rule. In Cuozzo, the 
Court formally applied Chevron’s framework and deferred, at Step Two, 
to the Patent Office’s decision to apply the “broadest reasonable 
construction” standard in its own administrative proceedings.320 Because 
Court’s decision defers to the Patent Office’s rule filling a gap in the 
statute, that Office retained the power to assess “the wisdom of its policy 
on a continuing basis.”321 
After further review, the Patent Office decided to reverse course: As 
noted above, the Patent Office has since promulgated a new rule 
directing the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to apply the “ordinary 
meaning” standard.322 The Patent Office’s decision explains that it is 
making this switch for policy reasons: After reflecting on “almost six 
years of historical data, user experiences, and stakeholder feedback,” the 
Patent Office concluded that applying the ordinary meaning standard 
would, in its view, yield “greater uniformity and predictability” and 
thereby “improv[e] the integrity of the patent system.”323 And the Patent 
Office further notes that the Supreme Court—by formally invoking 
deference in Cuozzo—expressly granted the Patent Office the flexibility 
to shift course in view of these six years of data.324 
The Patent Office, however, has (so far) been largely unable to 
execute similar policy shifts in other areas of patent law. Consider patent 
eligibility. As noted above, the Court’s decision on patent eligibility in 
Myriad reflects, in significant part, the Solicitor General’s argument. 
Alice, a case about the patent eligibility of abstract ideas implemented 
                                                   
320. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). 
321. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 
322. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 51340, 51341 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
323. Id. at 51341–42.  
324. Id. at 51341 (“The Supreme Court of the United States has endorsed the Office’s ability to 
choose an approach to claim construction for AIA proceedings. ‘That is a question that Congress 
left to the particular expertise of the Patent Office.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2144–46)); see also id. at 51346–47 (“[T]he six years of experience with AIA proceedings, the 
many additional parallel court cases, as well as the numerous requests from stakeholders . . . make 
clear that using the same claim construction standard as in federal courts and the ITC better serves 
the public.”). But see supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court may 
have conferred this policy flexibility on the Patent Office in a manner that is inconsistent with an 
expertise-focused theory of deference). 
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via a computer, is similar.325 There, the Solicitor General, drawing on 
Patent Office guidance (among other sources), advocates for a rule that 
distinguishes patent-eligible “innovation[s] in computing” from general, 
“abstract methods”—like using escrow to settle transactions—that 
“incorporat[e] a computer . . . in a conventional role.”326 Citing the 
Solicitor General’s brief, Alice explains that the patent under review is 
invalid: The claimed technology did not “improve the functioning of the 
computer itself,” but rather, was directed at an abstract idea and relied on 
a computer only to perform mere “conventional” tasks.327 In short, the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in both Myriad and Alice reflect the Solicitor 
General’s guidance on patentability. 
However, the Patent Office has since attempted—unsuccessfully—to 
vary these standards for patentability. In various documents, the Patent 
Office has revised its own interpretations of Alice, Myriad, and Mayo 
(the third case in the Court’s recent trilogy on patent eligibility). Most 
recently, for example, the Patent Office has explained that applications 
claiming an abstract idea that has been “integrated into a practical 
application” may be patent-eligible.328 Moreover, when determining 
whether a claim is so integrated into a practical application, the patent 
examiner must “exclude consideration of whether the additional 
elements represent well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”329 
But that guidance contradicts the Supreme Court’s directives in Alice, 
which explain that “well-understood, routine, [or] conventional” 
additions (such as relying on a computer, as a conventional tool, to 
implement an abstract idea) are insufficient to render an abstract idea 
patentable.330 
These apparent attempts at shifting the eligibility analysis have not 
gone well for the Patent Office. To be sure, the Patent Office’s 2019 
Guidance has yet to receive substantial judicial scrutiny. But even more 
modest increments in the Patent Office’s examination guidelines have 
earned substantial skepticism. For example, the Federal Circuit, 
considering a 2016 guidance document, explained that though it 
                                                   
325. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
326. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 25–30, Alice 
Corp., 573 U.S. 208 (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 828034 [hereinafter Alice Amicus Brief]. 
327. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225–26 (citing Alice Amicus Brief, supra note 326, at 28–30). 
328. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 55 (Jan. 7, 2019) 
(emphasis added). 
329. Id. 
330. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted); see also Pamela Samuelson 
(@PamelaSamuelson), TWITTER, (Sept. 26, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://twitter.com/PamelaSamuelson/
status/1044984627474182144 [https://perma.cc/8XSP-ESDK] (suggesting that the Patent Office’s 
new guidance attempts to “[o]verrule the Supreme Court”). 
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“respect[s] the [Patent Office’s] expertise,” it was “not bound by its 
guidance,” “especially regarding the issue of patent eligibility.”331 And 
the Federal Circuit’s rationale is exactly the one that Chevron and Brand 
X reject: Where Brand X, for example, stresses the Executive’s need for 
flexibility in the face of changing circumstances, the Federal Circuit’s 
decision on patentability is especially “mindful of the need for 
consisten[cy].”332 
In short, in the rare case where the Court has formally deferred to the 
Patent Office’s regulations, that Office has retained the policy flexibility 
that inheres in the doctrinal bases of such deference. But the Court more 
typically incorporates the reasoning presented in the Solicitor General’s 
briefs into precedent. And this mode of deference has hampered the 
Patent Office’s ability to later change course.333 Hence, the Court’s 
unusual, de facto mode of deference to the arguments of the Solicitor 
General constrains the Executive Branch’s ability to “adapt [patent] 
rules and policies” to “changing circumstances.”334 Instead, the 
Executive’s only recourse is to ask the Court to overturn Federal Circuit 
decisions or revise existing precedent under doctrines of stare decisis. 
But overturning patent precedents may be exceptionally hard to do.335 
* * * 
As I described above, the Court appears to implicitly defer to the 
Solicitor General’s merits determinations in many patent cases. But is 
this influence appropriate? To the extent that deference is founded on 
delegation, expertise, process, accountability, or flexibility, the answer 
seems to be no. OSG is not Congress’s patent policy delegee—and this 
matters when the Patent Office and the Solicitor General disagree. OSG 
has only limited patent- or Patent Act-related expertise. And even when 
the Patent Office and the Solicitor General confer and agree, the 
Solicitor General’s interventions allow the Patent Office to avoid the 
administrative procedures that would otherwise attend to rulemaking and 
                                                   
331. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 760 F. App’x 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
332. Id. 
333. Id.; see also Criddle, supra note 202, at 1279–81. 
334. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). 
335. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015) (some patent 
doctrines may enjoy a “superpowered form of stare decisis,” requiring “superspecial 
justification[s]” for overturning precedent); see also Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 994, 
1003 (2020) (similar). But cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 
1499 (2019) (“But stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable command.’” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quotation omitted))). Notably, OSG’s brief in Kimble argued in favor of stare 
decisis, explaining that there was no policy basis for overturning the precedent, Brulotte, at issue in 
the case. See Kimble, 576 U.S. at 2414 (“[T]he United States, which acts as both a licensor and a 
licensee of patented inventions while also implementing patent policy, vigorously disputes that 
Brulotte has caused any ‘significant real-world economic harm.’” (quoting Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Kimble, 576 U.S. 2401 (No. 13-720)). 
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rule changing, thereby limiting both the public’s influence over policy 
and its access to relevant policymakers. Moreover, the informal mode of 
this deference both deflects blame on to the Judiciary and constrains the 
Patent Office’s policy flexibility. To be sure, some cases present mixed 
results: Cuozzo, for example, scores well on flexibility but poorly on 
expertise. But on the whole, there is little, in terms of deference’s most 
favored rationales, to justify the Court’s apparent regime of implicit 
deference. 
B. Defective Deference Beyond Patent 
The problems that attend to the Solicitor General’s interventions in 
patent law may not be limited to that context. Wherever the Court 
applies its regime of de facto, implicit, or “consultative” deference to 
views developed by the Solicitor General (rather than any competent 
agency with principal policymaking responsibility), it is likely that the 
Solicitor General’s Office will suffer deficits in terms of delegation, 
expertise, process, and accountability. Stated simply, this is a problem of 
a general form: It may extend to other intellectual property domains, to 
other complex areas of law that lack substantive administrative 
oversight, and even (in some limited circumstances) to legal fields that 
include agencies with rulemaking power. 
Copyright offers one example. The Court’s most recent copyright 
decisions may seem to exhibit a similar pattern: The Copyright Office 
(like the Patent Office) exercises only limited substantive policymaking 
authority in only limited domains,336 and yet the Solicitor General’s 
views carried the day in both OT2018 copyright cases—Rimini Street v. 
Oracle USA337 and Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-
Street.com, LLC.338 To the extent the Court implicitly defers in these 
contexts, too, such deference seems unwarranted. The decision in Fourth 
Estate, for example, turned on the definition of “registration” for 
copyrighted works, and the Court’s interpretation closely matched 
OSG’s.339 And though OSG’s interpretation of the term “registration” 
draws from the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, the 
                                                   
336. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
337. 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2019). 
338. Id. at 888–89.  
339. Compare Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 888–89 (“Read together, § 411(a)’s 
opening sentences focus not on the claimant’s act of applying for registration, but on action by the 
Copyright Office.”), with Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13, 
15–19, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. 881 (No. 17-571) [hereinafter Fourth Estate 
Amicus Brief] (“The term ‘registration’ in Section 411(a) is most naturally read to refer to the 
Copyright Office’s official recording of an accepted copyright claim.”). The extent of the overlap 
between the decision and the briefs is even greater than I’ve highlighted here. 
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Copyright Office’s interpretation did not have to survive the “gauntlets 
of . . . notice and comment” rulemaking, and so neither the Copyright 
Office nor OSG had to reply every “material[ly]” “cogent” objection 
raised to its rule, as agencies are typically required to do.340 
This pattern also extends beyond intellectual property domains and 
into other fields of law, such as bankruptcy. Lauren Baer and William 
Eskridge describe the Court’s “consultative deference” to the Solicitor 
General in bankruptcy cases in some detail: 
In bankruptcy cases, there is no agency to which the Court can 
defer; there is no Bankruptcy Commission. Yet the Court often 
requests amicus briefs from the Solicitor General in bankruptcy 
cases. The attorneys who work on bankruptcy cases for the 
Solicitor General come to know their subject matter more deeply 
than the Justices could be expected to, consulting bankruptcy 
experts and drawing on the resources of the office of the United 
States Trustee, located in the Department of Justice. The 
analysis in these briefs often influences the Court’s judgment in 
ways that resemble Skidmore deference.341 
Yet in bankruptcy cases, as in patent cases, the Court’s deferential 
practice lacks foundation. The absence of any executive bankruptcy 
agency might suggest that Congress has declined to delegate 
policymaking power in bankruptcy cases to the Executive Branch. But 
OSG’s “textual and policy analyses” nevertheless wield wide influence 
in bankruptcy cases.342 And though OSG’s attorneys may come to 
understand bankruptcy law “more deeply than the Justices,” the Solicitor 
General’s Office is not itself actively involved in the development and 
enactment of bankruptcy law or policy.343 Rather, OSG’s expertise is 
borrowed from other experts and the office of the United States 
Trustee.344 This, again, is problematic from process and public 
participation perspectives. Indeed, the Solicitor General’s practice of 
consulting with the U.S. Trustee may bias OSG’s presentations to the 
                                                   
340. United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Nova Scotia 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977). Compare, e.g., Brief for the Nat’l Music 
Publishers’ Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp., 139 S. Ct. 881 (No. 17-571), 2018 WL 4252035 (explaining that administrative delays at the 
Copyright Office can “consume most or all of the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period, 
thereby eliminating altogether a copyright owner’s ability to bring an infringement action”), with 
Fourth Estate Amicus Brief, supra note 337, at 3–4 (“The average time for the [Copyright] Office 
to resolve a registration application is approximately eight months.”). 
341. Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1113. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
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Court: The United States is “often a creditor in bankruptcy” and has 
accordingly advanced “pro-creditor rule[s].”345 Because OSG’s meetings 
are generally private, there are only limited opportunities for the public 
to counter the influence exercised by the United States Trustee and the 
SG’s other favored experts. And because OSG’s decisionmaking process 
is closed, the public can have only a limited understanding of the 
reasoning behind the SG’s favored rule. 
Finally, the influence of the Solicitor General may be worrisome in 
any case where the Court defers to OSG after that Office has decided to 
override a primary agency’s policy determination. This is especially so 
where the primary agency’s determination has been made in accord with 
the powers conferred on the agency by Congress, where that decision 
has been informed by the agency’s expertise, and where the agency’s 
rule is the product of a public rulemaking process. Indeed, Maggie 
Lemos has detailed instances of such conflict between the Solicitor 
General and other agencies, including, especially, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. And her work details how, along 
many of these same metrics, OSG falls short to its agency adversary: 
She explains that, in such instances of agency conflict, the Court should 
play closer attention to Congress’s intended delegee, to loci of expertise, 
to the procedural protections attending to the agency’s rulemaking 
process (as compared to OSG’s brief-drafting process), among others.346 
In short, these cases of interagency conflict present one further general 
category of defective deference to the Solicitor General. 
III. DEFERENCE AND DECISIONAL AUTHORITY 
The Court seems to informally defer to the views of the Solicitor 
General in a range of patent cases. But, as I describe above, the Court’s 
treatment of the Solicitor General’s Office finds little footing in 
deference’s usual justifications. This gap thus gives rise to a further 
                                                   
345. Id. at 1114 n.115 (2008) (describing Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 
966–67 (1997) as an illustrative example). To be sure, this is consonant with the Solicitor General’s 
duty to represent the interests of the United States as a creditor. But the United States’s interest as 
creditor may not align with the public’s interest in an equitable or welfare-enhancing rule of 
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Rash, 520 U.S. at 966–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s 
rule “grants a general windfall to undersecured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors”). 
346. To be sure, Maggie Lemos explains that her project is “not about deference” because the 
Supreme Court has not “purported to defer to the views of the SG in the same way it does those of 
agencies.” Lemos, supra note 19, at 206 n.68. But the patent cases described above, together with 
the studies described in work by Lauren Baer and William Eskridge, John Duffy, and others, seems 
to suggest that the SG’s influence does seem to operate like this deference, at least in patent 
contexts. Indeed, Lauren Baer and William Eskridge suggest that the Court formalize its regime of 
consultative deference and fold it into its existing practices. Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 
1184. 
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question: If OSG is not properly the object of the Court’s deference, 
who, then, should decide the patent questions that present in cases like 
KSR, Merck, and Cuozzo? That is, who should exercise primary 
responsibility over such matters of patent policy? I consider here three 
possibilities: the Supreme Court, a reformed Solicitor General’s Office, 
and the Patent Office. The Patent Office is the winner. 
A. The Supreme Court 
One possible response to the problem of defective deference is to end 
the Court’s practice of deferring to the Executive Branch, and thereby 
return to the “standard account,” described above, of patent 
policymaking: The Judiciary (with the Supreme Court at its apex) 
decides questions of patent law and patent policy.347 If, after all, the 
Court’s practice is flawed, then it should stop deferring to Executive 
Branch and—as in some other areas of law—take up the decisional reins 
itself. 
That is plausible. But before declaring that the Court must itself 
decide matters of patent policy, it is worth considering why the Court 
has decided to defer to the Solicitor General, even absent a formal 
doctrine directing such deference. To the extent the Court’s decisions in 
these patent cases is explained by an implicit deference regime, what 
motivates the Court’s decision to defer at all? 
There may be two related explanations. First, the Court often relies on 
outside help in technical cases—say, patent or bankruptcy cases—
because of the Court’s own comparative inexpertise.348 The complex, 
technical details of these cases can sometimes confound the Court or 
cause the Justices to hesitate before setting out substantive, prescriptive 
rules.349 Second, the Court relies on OSG in particular because of its 
long-term institutional commitment to the interests of the public and the 
federal Government.350 The Solicitor General’s Office has an earned 
                                                   
347. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
348. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 25, at 694; Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1263 (2011). 
349. See, e.g., Thompson & Wachtell, supra note 11, at 281; see also Narechania, supra note 37, 
at 1356 (explaining that the Court seemed to demur on a technical and difficult question of patent 
law that it did not anticipate having to address). 
350. See, e.g., BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES, supra note 20, at 91; see also 
id. (finding that OSG’s relative success cannot be explained by the experience of its attorneys, the 
quality of its attorneys, its resource advantages, or its selectivity in case selection); Black & Owens, 
A Built-In Advantage, supra note 20, at 457–61 (similar). Instead, these studies suggest it is the 
Office’s professional, “credible commitment to broader goals of justice and efficiency” that 
influences the Court. BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES, supra note 20, at 91; see 
also Vladeck, supra note 20, at 123–24 (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: 
The Work of the Solicitor General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229 (1955)).  
13 Narechania.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:49 PM 
932 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:869 
 
reputation as the reliable, trustworthy voice of the Executive.351 
Together, these two explanations suggest that the Supreme Court needs 
some help in patent cases, and it trusts the Solicitor General to provide 
it. 
These explanations, to the extent they adequately explain the Court’s 
practice, undermine the case for the Supreme Court: The Court’s relative 
inexpertise (or, at a minimum, its self-perception as inexpert) suggests 
that—absent some more fundamental change to the Supreme Court—
deference to outside actors is likely.352 That is, no matter whether patent 
rules are informally constructed by OSG during litigation, or crafted 
elsewhere in the Executive Branch, defended by the SG, and formally 
reviewed under Chevron or Skidmore, some form of a deference regime 
is likely to prevail. The Court often wants outside help on substantive 
matters of patent law. So, taking such deference as given, to whom 
should the Court defer? 
B. The Solicitor General’s Office 
Given the Court’s apparent preference for deference, I turn away from 
the Court and to the Executive Branch. When the Court calls on the 
Executive Branch for advice, who should answer? 
One possibility is for the Solicitor General’s Office to continue to 
control and coordinate the Executive Branch’s patent policy responses—
but to reform OSG in ways that are responsive to the concerns set out 
above.353 
                                                   
351. E.g., BLACK & OWENS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCES, supra note 20, at 112; Kristen A. 
Norman-Major, The Solicitor General: Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV. 
1081, 1090 (1994). 
352. One might imagine any number of fundamental changes to the Court, many of which would 
be responsive to this expertise concern. For example, some commentators have suggested replacing 
the current Court’s composition with one drawn from the Courts of Appeals (including the Federal 
Circuit). Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 
181–85 (2019). This structure might help to mitigate some of the concerns regarding patent 
expertise. (Other possibilities—that cut in quite different directions—might include requiring the 
Justices to hire law clerks from all the Courts of Appeals (including the Federal Circuit, thereby 
helping to build relevant expertise at the Supreme Court), or stripping the Supreme Court of 
jurisdiction over patent cases altogether (giving the Federal Circuit the last word in such cases, 
thereby making the Court’s comparative inexpertise irrelevant)). But because the effects of such 
drastic changes—changes to the Court’s composition, the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Court’s 
hiring and personnel practices—are so far-reaching, I put such possibilities to one side for the 
purposes of this project. Cf. id. at 151 (explaining that their proposal is intended to help “preserv[e] 
the Court’s legitimacy as an institution above politics” and not to address questions of expertise or 
subject-area competency at the Court). 
353. Cf. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 683 (2005) (“Reforms should focus, for example, on supplying the 
executive’s constitutional approach with firmer empirical footing, greater institutional and popular 
insight, and more vigilant scrutiny of constitutional risk areas.”). 
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One objection, for example, to OSG’s process of policymaking-by-
litigation regards the public’s ability to participate in that Office’s 
decisionmaking process. As I described above, OSG’s litigation-based 
interventions depart from the processes that usually attend to agency 
rulemaking, and these departures limit the public’s ability to 
meaningfully inform the Executive Branch’s policies in certain classes 
of cases, including patent and bankruptcy matters.354 These procedural 
differences, however, are partially due to the differences in forum: 
Litigation moves on the Court’s timetable, whereas agencies control 
their own calendar. And, as a result, OSG’s ability and willingness to set 
out a proposed position, receive public comment, and respond 
substantively to those comments before advocating for a given rule—
say, an interpretation of the term “reasonable” or “component”—is often 
sharply limited. 
But not always. The Solicitor General’s Office must, to be sure, file 
its merits briefs in accord with the Supreme Court’s rules.355 And I 
assume (for present purposes) that the Court is unlikely to accommodate 
many special privileges for cases involving the Solicitor General.356 But 
OSG has far more flexibility when it responds to the Court’s calls for 
amicus help: When the Court invites OSG to file a certiorari-stage brief 
(known as a call for the views of the Solicitor General, or CVSG), the 
SG treats the invitation as a command. And though OSG tends to hold 
itself to a few informal and self-imposed deadlines, it retains significant 
flexibility over the schedule for filing a response.357 OSG’s self-imposed 
deadline is neither mandatory nor rigid.358 
For example, on January 7, 2019, the Court asked the Solicitor 
General for the Government’s views in two patent cases—Texas 
                                                   
354. Two contrasting anecdotes help illustrate. During one workshop discussion of this article, a 
workshop participant—a patent law professor—expressed some serious frustration at OSG’s lack of 
transparency in two pending patent cases: “It’s killing me that I don’t know what the SG is working 
on or going to say” in these two (redacted) cases. The following week, another professor mentioned 
a set of interactions with OSG regarding a different intellectual-property-related case. That stark 
contrast regarding notice, opportunity, and information—within a single population (the 
academy)—is suggestive of the transparency and process deficits that affect OSG’s policy-crafting 
and brief-drafting processes. 
355. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 33(g)(xi) (2019). 
356. But cf. SUP. CT. R. 34(4) (explaining that the Solicitor General need not seek leave to file an 
amicus brief). 
357. See McElroy, supra note 293 (“First, although the Court merely ‘invites’ the SG to file a 
brief, the SG treats it as a command. And . . . there are no deadlines for the SG to file” but OSG 
“has filed most invitation briefs at three times of the year: late May, so that the cases can be 
considered before the summer recess; around August, so that the cases can go on the summer list; 
and December, so that the cases can be considered in time to be argued that Term if the Court grants 
cert.”). 
358. See id. 
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Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics 
America, Inc. and HP v. Berkheimer.359 OSG filed its brief in Renesas a 
few months later, on May 21, recommending that the Court decline to 
review the case. But even by the end of the 2018 Term, OSG had not 
responded to the Court’s request in Berkheimer—informally extending 
its own self-imposed, triannual deadline for responding to the Court’s 
calls to almost one year. This example highlights both of the features of 
the SG’s process described above. First, it reinforces the view that the 
SG’s process is opaque. What was the cause of the (comparative) delay 
in Berkheimer? Why did this case take longer than others? Was the delay 
suggestive of some intra-Executive conflict? As in other examples of the 
SG’s decisionmaking process, we simply do not know. Second, the 
difference between Berkheimer and Renesas suggests that there is at 
least some flexibility in OSG’s internal processes. 
Such flexibility may allow OSG to craft a more accessible and 
accountable decisionmaking process. To the extent OSG’s closed 
process is designed (at least partially) around litigation’s time 
constraints, OSG’s control over its calendar in CVSG contexts enables 
it—either on its own accord, or on command from the President or 
Congress—to receive and respond to public comment from private 
actors and interested agencies before responding to the Court’s calls for 
amicus help. That is, where the Court has asked the SG to weigh in, 
OSG can run a decisionmaking process that more closely mimics regular 
administrative process, such as is set out in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.360 Such a process would have the virtues—consonant with 
deference’s theoretical foundations—of greater democratic 
accountability and deliberative process. 
But such process reforms—which themselves require significant 
changes to the operating norms of the Solicitor General’s Office—fail to 
address the several other objections to the Court’s deference to the 
Solicitor General. Even if, for example, OSG’s process was more 
transparent and procedurally rigorous, OSG’s influence might conflict 
with Congress’s apparent delegation to the Patent Office of such 
                                                   
359. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Tex. Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, 
Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2741 (2019) (mem.) (denying certiorari) (No. 18-
600), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, HP v. Berkheimer, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 911 
(2020) (mem.) (denying certiorari) (No. 18-415). 
360. Cf. Joshua Kastenberg, Safeguarding Judicial Integrity By Making the Executive Branch’s 
Unfettered Amicus Gateway Transparent, 38 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2017) (suggesting that the 
Judiciary impose added transparency requirements on briefs filed by OSG to facilitate closer review 
of Executive Branch positions). 
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policymaking power.361 Similarly, OSG—like the Court itself—is 
comparatively inexpert in patent policy. And OSG must act, if at all, 
through the Court—thereby deflecting responsibility on to another 
branch and limiting policy flexibility for future administrations. 
It is, to be sure, possible to imagine further reforms to OSG that 
respond to some of these concerns. If Congress were, for example, to 
authorize funding for a patent seat in the Solicitor General’s Office in 
view of the Court’s increased patent docket, that authorization would 
both reflect at least some congressional intent to confer (a particular sort 
of) decisionmaking power on OSG and improve that Office’s patent 
expertise. But even these more dramatic changes would not address the 
accountability and flexibility concerns that attend to this mode of 
policymaking-by-litigation. Such changes, moreover, may have the 
effect of undermining the very qualities that make the Solicitor 
General’s Office a trusted advisor to the Court. As noted above, OSG’s 
“broad[] view of litigation”—unencumbered by the “tunnel vision” that 
may characterize a single agency’s defense of its policy aims—gives it a 
distinct litigation advantage: The Solicitor General is able to translate the 
agency’s technical work more clearly.362 But, as more field-specific 
depth and expertise is built into particular personnel in OSG, that Office 
risks its ability to present cases to the Court in such familiar terms. It is 
also possible to imagine reforms to OSG that bring that Office closer to 
the President, and thus more accountable for its policy aims. But OSG’s 
political independence is one important font of the Supreme Court’s trust 
in that Executive Branch institution.363 Such reforms would thus 
undermine OSG’s ability to “to exercise independent and expert legal 
judgment” and reach its “own carefully reasoned conclusions.”364 
Without these features, OSG’s briefs might be seen primarily as political 
statements, and may thus be no more helpful to the Court than those 
filed by only one party’s members in Congress.365 
                                                   
361. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(A), 316(a)(4) (2018); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 
U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016); Neer, supra note 17, at 422 & n.69; Tran, supra note 24, at 614 
n.29. 
362. Lemos, supra note 20, at 209, 211. 
363. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 312, at 288; SALOKAR, supra note 2, at 
94; see also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 254–56. 
364. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 312, at 232; CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 18. 
365. See Pillard, supra note 353, at 684–85 (explaining that such reforms to OSG raise 
“[c]oncerns about adding to the institutional mechanisms of an already complex government 
machinery, [and] risks of interest-group capture of such mechanisms,” among others); see also Neal 
Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from Congressional Participation in 
Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 955 (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court should treat 
lawmaker briefs with skepticism. They are largely partisan statements intended to win favor with 
constituents.”). 
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Hence, correcting for the defects (in deference’s terms) in OSG’s 
institutional structure and internal processes problems might have the 
effect of undermining some of the important strengths that help make the 
Solicitor General’s Office a trusted advisor to the Supreme Court. This 
sets out a minor paradox: Strengthening the SG’s theoretical claim to 
deference undermines some of the features that, in fact, lead the Court to 
defer to the SG’s judgment. 
This paradox is resolved in other areas of the administrative state by 
separating the two functions that have collapsed into one in these patent 
cases: policymaking and policy defense.366 In most other fields of law 
governed by executive regulations, an administrative agency issues rules 
after expert consideration under regular process. OSG typically steps in 
only to help defend those rules (as it deems appropriate) from legal 
challenges, in view of its “independent and expert legal judgment.”367 
This model thus suggests a way forward for patent policy, too: OSG 
should continue to control policy defense—but the power to make policy 
should sit with an expert agency entrusted by Congress to set standards 
through regular administrative process. 
C. The Patent Office 
Given the Court’s proclivity to defer to the Executive Branch in 
technical and complex cases, such as patent cases, the Patent Office—
rather than any other executive agency (including the Solicitor General’s 
Office)—should exercise principal responsibility over matters of patent 
policy. I share this conclusion with Arti Rai, Melissa Wasserman, and 
John Golden—all of whom agree that the Patent Office has earned at 
least some deference from the Judiciary. But, as I suggested above, my 
path to this conclusion is somewhat different: While Melissa 
Wasserman, for example, examines the America Invents Act to conclude 
that the statute descriptively appears to confer policymaking authority 
(via adjudication) on the Patent Office, I begin, instead, with the premise 
that the Court seems bound to defer to the Executive Branch, and I 
conclude that, among the available options, the Patent Office is the 
entity within that Branch best suited to exercise such policymaking 
                                                   
366. I explore other aspects of this paradox in the Conclusion. Namely, I consider what it means 
for deference more generally that deference in practice does not seem to align with deference in 
theory, and I argue that practice should better reflect these theoretical foundations. 
367. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 312, at 232; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 
(2018) (Nos. 16–285, 16–300, 16–307) (explaining that in the SG’s view, “[a]lthough the Board’s 
interpretation of ambiguous NLRA language is ordinarily entitled to judicial deference, courts do 
not defer to the Board’s conclusion as to the interplay between the NLRA and other federal 
statutes”). 
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power.368 Along practically every dimension relevant to deference’s 
theoretical foundations, the Patent Office is best suited to exercise the 
policymaking authority that typically earns the Court’s respect. 
I have already described how the Patent Office is, in many respects, 
Congress’s delegee on matters of intellectual property policy. The Patent 
Act, for example, directs the Patent Office to counsel the Executive 
Branch “on matters of intellectual property policy.”369 And Congress has 
also long given the Patent Office the power to “establish regulations” 
that “govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office,” including patent 
application review.370 Hence, to the extent that deference is grounded in 
congressional delegations of policymaking power, these provisions of 
the Patent Act are best read as evidence of Congress’s intent to give the 
Patent Office such decisional power, and the Patent Office should so 
construe its statutory authority.371 
Moreover, Melissa Wasserman has described how the America 
Invents Act—the most recent set of major patent law reforms—
strengthens the Patent Office’s claim to the mantle of patent policy: In 
her view, Congress, by that Act, has “anoint[ed] the Patent Office as the 
chief expositor of substantive patent law,” authorizing it to set standards 
under its adjudicatory powers.372 Even John Golden—who has argued, 
contra Melissa Wasserman, that the Patent Office is eligible for only 
Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference—agrees that Congress has, by 
the America Invents Act, effectively conferred on the Patent Office 
some “variant of ‘primary jurisdiction’” over patent policy.373 
Likewise, the Patent Office is, comparatively, the most expert 
executive agent. Though commentators (including myself) have long 
been skeptical of the Patent Office’s expertise over the matters of 
economics, technology, and innovation that must inform patent policy, 
both Arti Rai and Melissa Wasserman have lauded the Patent Office’s 
                                                   
368. Compare Wasserman, supra note 15, at 1977–2005, with infra notes 369–386 and 
accompanying text. 
369. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(8)–(9) (2018). 
370. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C); Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 
(2016). 
371. The Federal Circuit, of course, disagrees. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–
50 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
The Supreme Court, however, should be understood to have taken a different view. See Cuozzo, 136 
S. Ct. at 2143 (questioning Cooper Techs.); see also id. (construing a similarly worded statute as 
granting the Patent Office the authority to issue regulations concerning the substantive standard for 
claim construction in inter partes review). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018) (“The Office 
may establish regulations . . . [that] shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.”), with 35 
U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations . . . governing inter partes review.”). 
372. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 1965; see also Rai, supra note 7, at 1280. 
373. Golden, supra note 45, at 1696. 
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strides toward developing such expertise, including by creating and 
staffing an internal Chief Economist’s Office.374 And, again, even John 
Golden agrees that the Patent Office “is unlikely to be deemed to have 
‘no expertise’ in substantive patent law.”375 Moreover, as I described 
above, the Patent Office is deeply expert in various specific aspects of 
the America Invents Act: Congress enacted that Act only “after many 
years of negotiation between the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office . . . and various congressional committees. The [Patent Office] 
prepared an early version of the legislation, then proceeded to send at 
least six views, letters, and various reports to congressional committees 
in the following years.”376 Nor are we necessarily limited to the Patent 
Office in its current form: The agency may expand its substantive 
expertise even further (and, indeed, might have motives to do so if it 
understood its statutory powers more broadly) by developing more 
expertise in innovation economics more generally, and by seeking 
congressional authorization to hire additional such staff, among other 
possibilities. In sum, the Patent Office has deep legislative expertise and 
growing technical expertise over core matters of patent policy—with the 
potential for even more. 
Similarly, along dimensions of political accountability, Justice 
Gorsuch has explained that the Patent Office’s Director “is a political 
appointee who serves at the pleasure of the President.”377 And the 
Director can (and has) used his powers under the America Invents Act to 
secure policy judgments that he and, presumably, the President seek.378 
                                                   
374. Rai, supra note 7, at 1278; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2012; see also Benjamin & Rai, 
supra note 38, at 316; Rai, supra note 7, at 1262; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 2008 (“[T]here is 
near-universal agreement that the institution charged with creating sound patent policy needs access 
both to economic and to technological data, as well as sufficient expertise to analyze and interpret 
this information.”). 
375. Golden, supra note 45, at 1692. 
376. Shobe, supra note 32, at 302 n.72. 
377. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
378. Id.; see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office Intervene in Its Own 
Cases?, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 225–27 (2018). Indeed, this growth in the Patent 
Office’s institutional capacity for policymaking since the America Invents Act’s passage may be 
more evident in view of the contrast between two cases—Myriad and Alice—described above. See 
supra notes 325–327 and accompanying text. I start from the (perhaps controversial, but certainly 
not unreasonable) position that the outcome of each decision is desirable. See, e.g., Patentable 
Subject Matter Reform, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019) 
(statement of Mark A. Lemley, Stanford Law School) (explaining that the Court’s decisions have 
“allowed defendants to weed out weak patent claims more quickly and cheaply than before”). But 
the Patent Office was on opposite sides of the outcome across these two cases: it disagreed with 
Myriad; it agreed with Alice. In Myriad, the relevant Patent Office guidelines were promulgated 
well before the passage of the America Invents Act and the instantiation of the Patent Office’s own 
Office of the Chief Economist. Indeed, as I noted above, Judge Bryson found the Patent Office’s 
2001 guidelines to be “perfunctory,” failing “reflect [the] thorough consideration” that is the 
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I do not, however, mean to suggest that the Patent Office is a model 
agency. Indeed, along dimensions of, say, reasoned deliberation, the 
Patent Office’s claims to deference sometimes falls short. For one, the 
Patent Office’s primary mechanism of policymaking under the America 
Invents Act is adjudication. But it is rulemaking—not adjudication—that 
confers many of the most important benefits to an agency’s policy-
setting  processes.379 
Moreover, even when the Patent Office engages in policymaking 
through procedures that resemble rulemaking—by, say, issuing 
guidelines to its patent examiners on eligibility or obviousness—its 
present procedures seem imperfect. In respect to the Patent Office’s 
revised guidelines on eligibility, for example, the agency announced its 
new guidelines on January 7, 2019, and made them immediately 
effective—while simultaneously opening a comment period.380 That is, 
the Patent Office activated its new policy before receiving and 
considering public comment on the new rules. To the extent the Patent 
Office wants these guidelines to have the “force and effect of law,” this 
is irregular.381 The Executive Branch is not typically able to bypass 
standard notice-and-comment procedures (except in emergencies) for 
such legislative rules.382 To be sure, the Patent Office may simply wish 
to issue “interpretative,” rather than binding “legislative,” rules.383 But it 
is difficult to imagine that the rules that patent examiners are required to 
apply in their review of patent applications do not effectively bind the 
public and the agency.384 Moreover, to the extent the Patent Office’s 
                                                   
hallmark of judicial deference to agency decisionmaking. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). These perfunctory procedures, moreover, reflected the Patent Office’s 
relative lack of decisional authority. Stated simply, in 2001, the Patent Office had neither the 
responsibility nor the capacity to set substantive policy. The Solicitor General’s brief in Alice, by 
contrast, cites Patent Office guidelines that were issued after the Patent Office hired its Chief 
Economist and after Congress enacted the America Invents Act. The Court, in turn, cites those 
aspects of the SG’s brief in its opinion setting out the bounds of patent eligibility for software. 
Hence, to the extent that Myriad and Alice reflect desirable policy outcomes, the Patent Office’s 
progression toward the outcome in Alice may be suggestive of that agency’s growing institutional 
capacity for sound policymaking. 
379. Koch, supra note 264, at 486; Rai, supra note 7, at 1281 (“Rulemaking, not adjudication, is 
the innovation of the administrative state.”); see also John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 903–05 (2004). 
380. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). 
381. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95–97 (2015). 
382. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2018) (notice and comment procedures are not required when “the 
agency for good cause finds . . . [such procedures to be] impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary”); 
see, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, v. NHTSA, 894 F.3d 95, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he good cause 
exception . . . is generally confined to emergency situations.”). 
383. Perez, 575 U.S. at 95–97. 
384. Brendan Costello, Note, Rulemaking §101, 129 YALE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2020) 
(contending that the Patent Office’s eligibility guidelines are legislative rules); see also Manning, 
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more powerful adjudicatory proceedings are to be informed “by an 
activity much like rulemaking”—“guideline formation through 
widespread consultation with relevant stakeholders”—the Patent Office 
should employ procedures, like standard notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, that more closely resemble so-called legislative 
rulemaking.385 Indeed, these procedural defects continue to offer courts, 
including the Federal Circuit, a ready excuse to dismiss the Patent 
Office’s guidelines.386 A turn toward more standard procedures would 
lend more legitimacy—and perhaps even formal deference—to the 
Patent Office’s determinations. 
But even accounting for these defects in the Patent Office’s current 
procedures, that agency is, compared to OSG, better suited along several 
dimensions to exercise policy-setting authority. Stated simply, the Court 
is likely to defer, one way or another, to the Executive Branch on 
matters of patent policy—and, under those circumstances, it is the Patent 
Office, more than any other agency, that ought to exercise principal 
policymaking responsibility over such questions. 
* * * 
My claim that the Patent Office ought to exercise primary jurisdiction 
over questions of patent policy might seem, when viewed against the 
backdrop of the existing deference doctrines, unremarkable. But, as I 
describe above, the Supreme Court appears to defer (if implicitly) to the 
views advanced by the Solicitor General in patent cases—even in cases 
where the Solicitor General and the Patent Office disagree, in cases 
where the Solicitor General’s rationale varies from the Patent Office’s 
reasoning, and in cases where the Solicitor General acts as conduit for 
the Patent Office’s own untested and procedurally defective policy 
preferences. Such de facto deference to the Solicitor General is 
problematic along a variety of dimensions, including delegation, 
                                                   
supra note 354, at 894 (suggesting that the distinction between a legislative rule and an 
interpretative one turns on a “subtle judgment—that such a rule does not reflect excessive 
policymaking discretion, but rather reflects sufficient policy guidance from an antecedent statute or 
legislative regulation. So understood, the D.C. Circuit’s nonlegislative rule case law simply seeks to 
ensure that important policy judgments emerge from the more formal deliberative processes that 
produce legislation or legislative rules”). And by the Patent Office Director’s own admission, the 
rules at issue here almost certainly rise to the level of importance that should require notice-and-
comment procedures. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks 
Delivered at the Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting (Sept. 24, 2018) 
(explaining that he is issuing new guidelines because the Patent Office “cannot wait” while 
Congress undertakes a “long” and “uncertain” legislative process to respond to cases like Alice and 
Myriad); see also Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
the Patent Office’s guidelines “gover[n] its internal practice”). 
385. Rai, supra note 7, at 1280–81. 
386. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 760 F. App’x 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
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expertise, and accountability, among others. In view of these defects, 
any number of institutions may take the lead on matters of patent policy. 
The Court, for example, might decide these questions without reference 
to the policy preferences of the Executive Branch. Or the Solicitor 
General’s Office might implement reforms to legitimate its claim to such 
deference. But the obvious—and, in my view, the obviously correct—
answer is to confer such policymaking power on the Patent Office. I do 
not make a strong claim here as to whether the Patent Office has earned 
deference under Chevron or merely under Skidmore. Rather, my claim is 
somewhat narrower: To the extent the Court defers to the Executive 
Branch at all in patent cases—implicitly or explicitly, Skidmore or 
Chevron—that deference is owed primarily to the Patent Office, and 
only in view of the considerations that have traditionally informed 
deference doctrines—delegation, deliberation, expertise, and 
accountability, among others. 
And while I contend that the Patent Office should exercise principal 
responsibility over patent policy, I do not mean for these possibilities to 
be mutually exclusive. Indeed, all three institutions should respond to 
these defects in the relationship between the Executive Branch and the 
Judiciary. The Court, for example, should be more mindful of the source 
and the pedigree of the rules that OSG advances in its patent briefs. Is 
OSG’s advocacy consistent with Patent Office practice? Is the Executive 
Branch seeking a policy change that has not been tested through some 
sort of administrative process before the patent community? Such checks 
for procedural regularity are well within the Court’s competence.387 And 
if any of the regular indicia undergirding deference are absent, then the 
Court should treat OSG’s substantive claims with greater skepticism 
than it would arguments that are consistent with Patent Office practices 
developed in accord with regular agency procedure. In such cases, the 
Court, might, for example, formally “refer” the issue to the Patent Office 
under the “doctrine of ‘primary jurisdiction,’” which “seeks to produce 
better informed and uniform legal rulings by allowing courts to take 
advantage of an agency’s specialized knowledge, expertise, and central 
position within a regulatory regime.”388 Such hard look review gives the 
Executive Branch an incentive to align its own patent policymaking 
processes with the administrative procedures set out in the 
Administrative Procedure Act and in cases like Chenery. 
                                                   
387. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 584 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016). 
388. Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part); see Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327, 361 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (similar, but for the FCC); see also Golden, supra note 45, at 1696 (describing the 
Patent Office’s authority as “a variant of ‘primary jurisdiction’”). 
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Likewise, the Solicitor General should move incrementally towards a 
more transparent decisionmaking process. OSG need not upend entirely 
its brief-drafting process. But it might accept comments on pending 
CVSGs, describe publicly how interested parties can file comments, and 
make all such comments publicly available—including those it receives 
from other agencies and parties to the litigation. In view of OSG’s 
flexibility in responding to certiorari-stage calls for amicus help, and its 
existing practices of meeting with parties and interested agencies, these 
reforms are relatively modest—yet go a long way toward a process that 
reflects greater public participation and accountability. And to the extent 
that such deference exists along a continuum,389 such modest shifts in 
favor of greater procedural rigor and public accountability improve 
OSG’s claim to the de facto deference that it in fact enjoys. 
Finally, the Patent Office should wield its authority to make rules 
governing patent examination to shape patent policy.390 In doing so, it 
should also employ procedures that more closely resemble ordinary 
rulemaking, by, for example, announcing new policies and seeking 
comment on such proposals before implementing them. And, consistent 
with the proposals by Melissa Wasserman and Chris Walker, the Patent 
Office should seek agency-head review of adjudication decisions, in 
order to bring that agency’s process of policymaking-by-adjudication in 
line with the rest of the administrative state.391 This is so no matter 
whether it formally seeks deference under Chevron: Even under 
Skidmore, such process and accountability concerns may affect whether 
the Patent Office’s practices reflect the sort of “informed judgment to 
which courts . . . may properly resort for guidance.”392 
CONCLUSION: DEFERENCE THROUGH A PATENT LENS 
The Solicitor General’s Office quietly wields important influence 
over a wide range of the Supreme Court’s cases, including, notably, 
patent cases. Indeed, this influence mimics, in many respects, the 
Court’s more formal doctrines of deference: Where the Court can 
discern a clear command from Congress (as in SAS Institute or Helsinn 
                                                   
389. See, e.g., Baer & Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1184; see also John M. Golden, The USPTO’s 
Soft Power, 66 SMU L. REV. 541, 549 (2013) (“As opposed to the uniformly heavy thumb that 
Chevron purports to provide in favor of agency interpretations, Skidmore thus gives deference on a 
sliding scale.”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron 
Space” And “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012). 
390. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2144 (2016). 
391. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 175–78 (2018). 
392. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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Healthcare), the Court will require the Executive to follow the statute as 
enacted. But where a statute speaks in indefinite terms—say, allowing 
for “reasonable” exceptions from infringement liability—the Court is 
often content to let the Executive prescribe the policies that inform the 
interpretation of that ambiguous provision. 
At first blush, this seems utterly unremarkable: In many other fields 
of law, the Court defers to Executive Branch interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes under Chevron or, less decidedly, under Skidmore. 
And Chevron and Skidmore are themselves grounded in various ideals: 
Courts (and the Supreme Court) defer to executive agencies because 
Congress so intended, because those agencies have relevant specialized 
knowledge, because agencies can be held to account for their decisions, 
because agencies have greater capacity to collect and analyze salient 
data, and (perhaps to a lesser degree) because agencies can adapt their 
rules to changing times. 
But a closer look at these patent cases reveals that the Court’s 
decisions align often with the advocacy of the Solicitor General’s 
Office—but not necessarily with the preferences or the reasoning of the 
Patent Office. The Solicitor General’s advocacy in such patent cases 
fails to reflect these ideals of deference. 
So what should we make of the Court’s apparent implicit deference to 
the Executive Branch? In view of the Court’s comparative inexpertise 
(or its own view that it is inexpert), I expect that the Court will continue 
to seek outside help in such technical and complex cases. Hence, taking 
the Court’s preference to defer as constant, I conclude that the Executive 
Branch should amend its practices to ensure that the Patent Office 
exercises principal responsibility over patent policy questions. And I 
consequently contend that the SG’s claims in patent cases may 
sometimes deserve a hard look, in order to discern whether they accord 
with Patent Office practices and rationales. That is, the Supreme Court 
should vary its existing practices to defer only when appropriate (as 
assessed by deference’s own lights),393 and to refer open questions to the 
Patent Office under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, in order to 
improve Executive Branch decisionmaking. 
These questions about the appropriate scope of the Supreme Court’s 
deference to the Executive Branch in patent cases sound in a 
contemporary debate about Chevron and deference itself. Should the 
Judiciary defer to the Executive at all? Here, a Chevron 
counterrevolution has been brewing: Scholars have raised a variety of 
objections to the apparent concentration of policymaking power in the 
                                                   
393. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 2400 (2019).  
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Executive Branch, Congress has proposed legislation revising the 
standard for judicial review of agency action, and even Members of the 
Supreme Court have lamented the scope and nature of the Judiciary’s 
deference to executive agencies.394 Among these myriad critiques, which 
range from structural constitutional concerns to concerns that deference 
is systematically biased in favor of government litigants,395 is a view that 
the Judiciary “reflexively defers” to the Executive, even when such 
deference may be unwarranted.396 
Though a complete defense of Chevron is outside my present scope, 
the patent experience nevertheless helps to illuminate both this specific 
reaction to Chevron as well as one possible solution. The Court’s 
implicit deference to the Solicitor General seems emblematic of a 
deference regime run amok—one that allows the Court “to punt hard 
questions of statutory interpretation or administrative law” to a trusted 
executive agent, even where it seems evident that Congress did not 
intend for that particular agency to exercise that particular policy 
discretion.397 The Court’s deference to the SG seems “reflexive”—and to 
the extent the Court defers to the Solicitor General’s views in patent 
cases because of OSG’s accumulated institutional capital, or because it 
offers a facially reasonable answer to a complex question in a technical 
field of law, this critique is valid. The Solicitor General has little claim 
to the mantle of patent policy, and so policy positions secretly crafted in 
the heat of litigation defense rightfully require a hard look from the 
Court. Judicial deference is not a reward for the favored or the 
trustworthy: Instead, as I have said several times already, it reflects 
Congress’s allocation of decisionmaking authority, it reflects an 
agency’s expertise and analytic capacity, and it reflects the President’s 
(and, ostensibly, the voting public’s) policy priorities. As in Kisor, then, 
deference is appropriate only where these conditions are satisfied.398 
This valid critique, however, is specific to such reflexive applications 
of deference, and does not to apply to deference more generally. Indeed, 
                                                   
394. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Gutierrez-Brizula v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); 
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
395. E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 394, at 130. 
396. Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. __,138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In 
according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in [only] 
cursory analysis . . . . The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is 
troubling.”). 
397. Jonathan H. Adler, What’s Wrong with Chevron Deference Is Congress, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (June 6, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/whats-wrong-with-
chevron-deference-is-congress/ [https://perma.cc/A9ZU-4ZQL]. 
398.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 2400 (2019); Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644, 673 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
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judicial deference to the well-considered views advanced by Congress’s 
expert delegee under the President’s supervision is, and ought to be, 
uncontroversial: Such deference is founded in values sounding in the 
separation of powers, comparative institutional competence, and public 
accountability. 
In short, there appears a gap between deference as it ought to be and 
deference as it sometimes is. But the right response to this disconnect is 
not to eliminate deference entirely. Instead, as I have suggested for the 
patent context, it is simply to return to the doctrine’s foundations, and to 
eliminate “reflexive” applications of deference in favor of more studied 
ones. Courts should carefully examine a statute’s “text, nature, and 
purpose” to discern the scope of Congress’s delegation to the agency,399 
and they should ultimately “respect that leeway which Congress 
intended the agencies to have,” in view of such factors as “agency 
expertise,” “administrative experience,” among others.400 The Chevron 
Question is thus not whether deference is appropriate but when. The 
answer depends—as it does in choosing between the Patent Office and 
the Solicitor General’s Office—on the foundations of deference. 
                                                   
399. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
400. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)). 
